War in the Heart and Mind: The Moral Domain of the Guerrilla Warrior.

AD-A262 606
A Monograph by Major Daniel L. Zajac
Armor
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School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College ~~Fort Leavenworth, Kansas f
First Term AY 92-93
Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited
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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE S. FUNDING NUMBERS WAR IN THE HEART AND MIND: T’IE MORAL DOMAIN OF THE GUERRILLA WARRIOR. (U)
MAJ DANIEL L. ZAJAC
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113. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) SEE ATTACHED SHEET.
14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF PAGES MORAL DOMAIN GUERRILLA WARFARE 57 COMBAT MOTIVATION VIET CONG (1960-1975) 16. PRICE CODE COMBAT-STRESS YUGOSLAV PARTISANS -(1941-45) 17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION I18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 120. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT; OF REPORT OF THIS PAC-‘j OF ABSTRACT 1UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED IUNCLASSIFIED 1UNLIMITED NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard rorm 298 (Rev 2-89) Phio~ribiifi by A14Sf Sid 139-18
The Moral Domain of the Guerrilla Warrior.
A Monograph
by
Major Daniel L. Zajac
Armor
School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
First Term AY 92-93
Approved ror Public Release; Distribution Is Unlimited
SCIIOL OF ADVANCED MIIT=ARY SIUDIES
MDNGRAPH APPRVAL
Major Daniel L. Zalac
Title of Monograph: Var in the Heart and Mind: The Moral Dowain Q thbe G2errilla Warrio.
Approved by:
Lie Colonel Michbel C. Griffith, MBA
Director, School of Advan ced l James R. McDonough, Military Studies
/~K’, ~/:’4~ .-. Director, Graduate Degree Philip J. Biookes, Ph.D. Programs
Acepted this A day of 199L.. Acc.–hio r or
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WAR IN THE HEART AND MIND: THE MORAL DOtAN OF THE GUEU A WAURRIOR by MAJ Daniel L. Zajac, USA, 57 pages.
This monograph seeks to determine if the moral domain of battle for guerrilla soldiers is different from that of conventional soldiers. The works of cl3ssical and contemporary military theorists address various factors that impact on the moral domain of battle for the individual soldier. These works discuss the moral domain almost exclusively from the perspective of conventional soldiers. As the United States faces the challenges of the post cold war world, the likelihood of military intervention in conflicts in-o)lving guerrilla warfare may increase. If established moral domain theory does not apply to guerrilla warfare then new paradigms addressing the guerrilla merit investigation. Understaxding what motivates the guerrilla soldier in combat will assist the U.S. Army in the development of tactics, techniques and procedures to defeat guerilla movements. This study focuses on rural-based guerrillas in combat at the tactical level of war. The evidence includes a review of theory on the moral domain and case studies on the guerrilla forces of the Yugoslavian Partisans (1941-44) and the Viet Cong (1960-75). Classical and contemporary theories desc-ibing the moral domain of conventional soldiers provide a base line for comparisons with guerrilla fighters. The monograph employs Anthony Kellett’s “factors affecting combat motivation” as criteria in a comparative analysis of the guerrilla’s moral domain. Those factors are: importance of the primary group; unit esprit; manpower allocation; socialization; training; discipline; leadership; ideology; rewards; preconceptions of combat; aspects of combat; cambat stress; and combat behavior. The monograph concludes that Kellett’s factors and much of the classical moral domain theory do apply to the guerrilla. However, while the basic construct is applicable, the nature of saoe factors is significantly different. The monograph explores these differences and their implications for counterguerrilla doctrine.
iii
Table of Contents
Page
I. Introduction …. .. …….. 1 The Moral Domain. orwetional and Guerrilla Warfare.
II. Theretical Perspective of the Moral Dwmain of Jhe Conventional Soldier ………………………………………………. o……… 4
III. Analysis of the Moral Domain of the Guerrilla ………………….. 18 The Y•jgoslavian Partisans 1941-44. The Viet Cong 1960-75. Factors Affecting the Moral Domain and the Guerrilla Importance of the prioary group. Unit Esprit. Manpwer allocation. Socialization. Training. Discipline. Leadership. Ideology. Rewards. Precnceptions of Combat. I Aspects of combat. Combat stress. Combat behavior. IV. conl us ons…. …….. ….. ……… . ……… . 35 …
V. Implications……… ………………….. ……. 38
Appendix 1. Organization of the People’s Liberation Armed F rce………. 41
Appendix 2. Three-by-Three Organization of PLA Main Force Units ……….. 42
Endntes …………………………………… 43 Bibliogapy …….
iv
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I. IMRDUTON
ThrcAghaut history pradinent military theorists and practitioners have
stressed the importance of understanding the relationship between people and
war. Despite the emphasis that many theorists place on the moral daoain of
battle, few of them addressea the subject in different forms of war.
Guerrilla warfare is one form of war escaping differentiation in theory of
the moral domain. If generally accepted theory of the moral domain does not
apply to the guerrilla, then new paradigms that address the guerrilla merit
investigation. This subject is particularly relevant given the number of
guerrilla wars currently in progress.
Today as the Sendero DLunoso rocks Peru, the descendents of Tito’ s
Partisans ravage Yugoslavia, and Muslim guerrillas threaten a fledgling
Russian democracy, guerrilla wars continue t-) disrupt peace. In addition to
threatening their homelands, guerrilla movemerts menace peaceful nations in
close proximity. Every day the potential for exparnied conflagrations grows.
As the United States faces the challenges of the post cold war world, the
likelihood of military intervention in conflicts involving guerrilla warfare
increases. A better understanding of what keeps the guerrilla fighting will
benefit the U.S. Army in the develcpnent of doctrine, tactics, techniques and
procedures to defeat guerrilla forces. Unfortunately our current doctrine,
embodied in Field Manual 90-1-, Counterguerrilla Operations, pays little
attention to the guerrilla’s moral domain.
This study seeks to determine if the moral domain of battle for guerrilla
soldiers is different frum that of conventional soldiers. The breadth of
this subject requires limits. Therefore, the focus is limited to rural-based
guerrilla soldiers in battle at the tactical level of war. The evidence
S/ / -” • . [1
includes a survey of moral damain theory and case studies of Tito’s Partisans
(1941-44) and the Viet Cong (1960-75). Anthony Kellett’s “factors affecting
combat motivation” provide a construct of the moral dcmain for conventional
soldiers as well as criteria to analyze the moral domain of guerrillas. 1
This studiy is based on primary and secondary sources recounting the
experiences of the guerrillas. There are no empirical data from studies with
controlled experiments available to draw upon.
The Moral Dcmain.
The theoretical basis of the moral dcmain can be found in the writings of
classical and contemdorary military theorists. The phrase ‘1.cral Domain, of
Battle” has its origins in Clausewitz’ seminal work, Oan r.2 The moral
doimain is the field of influence that affects the will of combatants. It
includes all variables that enhance or detract from a soldier’s will to
fight. The importance of will can best be understood in the framework of the
following equation:
F=- M x W Where F=Force HM4ean* ~will
“Conbat motivation” is a term employed to describe will enhancing variables
while “negative combat stress” is used to describe variables that detract
from the will of combatants. Thus, the equation can be expanded as follows:
F- M x (W+m-s) Where F=-Force H=Ileans W1Will m mbat motivation e=negative cambat stress
The U.S. Army defines stress as:
2
. . . the body’s response to a demand (stressor). Stressors are events or situations that require a change, create internal emotional conflict, or pose a threat. The demands may be physical (cold, injury, disease) or mental •fear, conflict, pressure). Stressors can be positive or negative. Depending upon how it is perceiv.d by the soldier. . . . Stressor plus perception causes stress.4
In his comprehensive work, Combat Motivation, Anthony Kellett defines
cambat motivation as:
. . . the conscious or unconscious calculation by the combat soldier of the material and spiritual benefits and costs likely to be attached to various courses of action arisirn from his assigned cumbat tasks. Hence motivation comprises the influences that bear on a soldier’s choice of, degree of commi~ent to, and persistence in effecting, a certain course of action.
The last line of Kellett’s definition broadens combat motivation to the point
of encxmpassing the entire moral dcmain. As written it includes factors that
both enhance and detract from will. Kellett’s definition and the factors
(affecting cambat motivation) he derived provide a useful construct of the
mrcal domain.
Conventional and Guerrilla Warfare.
Conventional military organizations are uniformed forces that generally
abide by the laws of war and are employed in overt attempts to secure a
legitimate government’s political objectives. These objectives normally
involve the capture or retention of territory and (or) the destruction of
enemy forces. Conventional forces can be employed in all types of conflict
from general war to operations short of war.’, They are capable of conducting
operations without the use of nuclear weapons, or unconventional methcds.
Conventional forces do not employ subvýrsion, \sabotage, covert or clandestine
operations as methods. Unlike guerrillas, conventional forces generally operate outside enemy controlled or politically sensitive territory. 6
:3
Guerrilla warfare eludes a simple definition. Joint Publication 1-02
defines guerrilla warfare as a form of unconventional warfare characterized
by “military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held or hostile
territory by irregular, predaminantly indigenous forces.” 7 Field Manual
90-8. 0ounterquerrilla O-eratinS, defines guerrilla forces as:
the overt combat element of the insurgent organization. The members of the guerrilla force are organized under military cncepts to conduct military and paramilitary operations. Their duties usually include all overt agtions . . . but may include covert and clandestine operations.
Guerrilla warfare may occwr as part of inter-state and intra-state wars,
across the entire spectrum of conflict. It has been employed to support
conventional forces, as the overt manifestation of an insurgency or a combina
tion of both. Guerrilla warfare is generally employed by the “strategically
weaker side” to give it limited offensive capabilities. 9 The guerrilla’s
primary methods are small unit raids, ambushes and sabotage.
Guerrilla wars appear in many forms. Wars fought for national liberation
against colonial powers, aggressors, or foreign occupiers provide many
examples. Guerrillas have played central roles in civil wars involving
revolutionary struggles based on social demands. These struggles often
involve political, ethnic, religious, or ethnic-religious minorities fighting for sece.ssionist or lesser aims. 1 0 In many conflicts, guerrilla marfare is
manifested by commando actions launched by a major combatant against enemy
rear areas. This study accepts the descriptions of guerrilla warfare
discussed above. Urban guerrillas and terrorists are excluded from the
parameters of guerrilla warfare in this study.
II. TH* RETICAL PERSPEIVE OF THE MORAL DCMAIN OF THE MNVEMONAL SOLDIER.
The works of clasL-ical and contemporary military theorists address
4
various factors that impact on the moral domain of battle for the individual
soldier. Six theorists who placed significant empiasis on the moral domain
in their uTitings were de Saxe, von Clausewitz, du Picq, Moran, Marshall and
Kellett. The works of these authors discuss the moral domain of battle
almost exclusively in terms of conventional soldiers.
Maurice de Saxe was among the earliest military writers to address the
moral domain of war. For de Saxe, knowledge of the ‘%uman Heart”, a feel for
what is required to motivate soldiers every day, was the most important
element in war.11 In My Reveries Upon the Art of War written in 1732, de
Saxe described a number of organizational and doctrinal innovations, all
focused on reinforcing the will of the common soldier. He was prophetic,
contributing numerous practical ideas that many armies eventually adopted.
onar, by Carl von Cl;usewitz, includes numerous references to the moral
domain; he believed that moral fdctors outweighed all others in war. 12 In
Chapter Three of Book I, “On Military Genius”, Clausewitz described four
elements that comprise the climate of war. Those elements are “danger,
exertion (and suffering], uncertainty and chance.”,1 3 He returned to the
moral domain in Chapters Three through Six of Book III, identifying the
principal moral elements as “the skill of the coanarder, the experience and
courage of the troops, and their patriotic spirit.”’14 Together these
concerts define the great theorist’s view of the moral domain.
Ardant du Piog’s enduring contribution to military thought is a
campilation of his writings that were published posthumously in 1880 and
titled, Battle Studies. His work is an examination of the relationship
between men and battle. Du Picq’s personal experience, historical studies
(of ancient and modern battles) and research (in the form of questionnaires)
5
lend credibility to his ideas.
Du Picq based his ideas on the beliefs that man is the fundamental
instrument of war and that basic human ;-ature is constant. 15 Echoing de
Saxe, he saw the human heart as the start point in the study of war, stating,
“Nothing can be wisely prescribed in an army . . . withot: exact knowledge of
the fundamental instrument, man, and his state of mind, his morale, at the
instant of combat.” 16 He explored the interaction of courace, discipline.
unit cohesion, morale and men in combat. Furthermore, du P~cq explained how
organization, tactics and leadership must be tailored (terpered by national
characteristics) to maximize soldier effectiveness in battle. He strongly
believed that detailed studies of men in battle were the key to developing
apropriate military organizations and methods.17
Written in 1945, TheAnatomy of Cr was Lord Mocan’s attempt to
determine “how courage is born and how it is sustained in a modern army of a
free people.” 18 Moran derived most of his concepts from personal
experience in the First World War. He believed that fear was generated when
man’s survival instinct reacted to danger. Men responded to fear by making a
conscious choice between acts of courage or cowardice. Moran viewed courage
as a moral quality and a matter of character while cowardice was a powerful
regard for personal safety in the face of the enemy. 1 9
Arguably the most famous commentary on men in battle is S.L.A. Marshall’s
Men Aoainst Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future Wjr. Published in
1947, Marshall’s work was a reaction to the period’s emphasis on technology
in war. Marshall believed that the human element had been neglected in
recent military thought and that masses of infantry in close combat retained great importance in war despite the destructiveness -f miodern weaponry. 2 0
With this in mind he set out to discern “how the masses of our men react in
battle and to measure common denominators of our weakness and our strength in
close combat.” 2 1 In addition, he wanted to “remark on those matters which
are vital to the efficiency of men in combat.” 2 2 Inevitably his inquiries
led to an analysis of the moral damain. Marshall’s evidence was gathered
frao innovative combat after-action interviews in World War II and personal
experience in both World Wars. As an official U.S. military historian,
Marshall interviewed the survivors of small units in Europe and the Pacific
soon after their engagements. By piecing together these first-hand accounts
he derived simple conclusions that echoed many concepts already explored by
de Saxe, von Clausewitz and du Picq.
A recent work addressirq moral domain theory is Anthony Kellett’s Carbat
Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle. Kellett, an analyst in the
Operational Research and Analysis establishment of the Canadian Department of
National Defence, incorporated much of the moral dcmain theory explored by
his predecessors. He synthesized and integrated those theories to define
“factors affecting combat motivation.” Those factors are: importance of the
primary group; unit esprit; manpower allocation; socialization; training;
ciscipline; leadership; ideology; rewards; preconceptions of combat; aspects of combat; combat stress; and combat behavior. 23
I grtance of the Primary GrQ•
Du Picq stressed the need to build cohesion by stabilizing combat groups that fostered hrhood, professional knowledge, sentiment and unity. 24
He might have been the first to address the concept of the primary group.
Kellett’s concept of the primary group largely mirrors du Picq’s. The
primary group is formed by mutual attraction, tactical requirements,
7
interdependence and shared values. In battle these groups have two p:imary
goals. The first is individual and group survival. The second is mission
acc lishment. Social pressure and the physical and psychological support
of peems help soldiers overcome negative stressors. Pride, ego and a desire
to be accepted by the group weigh heavily on group members. While these
groups are normally essential to unit cohesion in battle, they can have a negative effect when they work against the goals of the larger unit. 25
Marshall believed that unit cohesion helped men overcom the debilitating
effects of isolation and fear. The most impzortant factors facilitating
cohesion and, thus, courage revolved around the primary group.
On the field of fire it is the touch of human nature which givs men courage and enables them to make proper use of their weapons. . . . By the same token, it is the loss of this touch which freezes men and impairs all action. Deprive it of this vitalirn spark and ro man would go forward against the enem.
This touch of human nature is maintained by physical (“the near presence or
the presumed presence of a comrade”) and spiritual unity between the men of a unit. 27 Cmuunications between unit members and their leaders on the
battlefield is an essential factor facilitating this unity. Soldiers who
felt they belonged to a cohesive unit often performed well in battle. A
soldier’s desire to help his peers, thereby maintaining their respect and
confidence, was critical for “personal honor is the one thing valued more than life itself by the majority of men.,, 28
Unit esprit “enlargens and canalizes primary group bonds” and
subordinates primary group goals to a higher cause. 29 Du Pioq expressed
this in his analysis. “We animate with passion, a violent desire for
8
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independence, a religious fanaticism, national pride, a love for glory, a madness for possession.” 30 De Saxe advocated the establishment of unit identities and histories to foster cohesion and esprit. 31 To build an army
as a true extension of the nation’s will, he advocated conscription flavored by the elevation of nationalism and thc honor of military service. 32
Besides outward manifestations in tradition, history and symbology, esprit is
heavily affected by “recruiting, training, and assignment practices that
personalize the [military] commnity.” 33 Therefore unit turbulence caused by rotation and replacement policies has a great impact on esprit. 34
Clausewitz equated the importance of an army’s spirit with the ability of
its leader. The source of spirit was the interaction of “a series of
victorious wars” and “frequent exertions of the army to the limits of its
strerth.,,35 Clausewitz believed that ‘military virtues” – consisting of
“obedience, order, rule, and method” – were found only in regular
armies.26 Irregular forces substitute “natural qualities” – “bravery,
adaptability, stamina and enthusiasm” -. for military virtues. 37 When
Clausewitz defined courage resulting from positive motives – “ambition
patriotism, or enthusiasm of any kind” -, he was describing Kellett’s concept of esprit. 38
ManrMerAllocatio
Marpoiqe allocation involves the organization, replacement and rotation
practices of an army. The structure of an army’s organizations can have
crucial effects on the formation of cohesive primary groups. Similarly, the
balance of manpower and differences between fighting and supporting soldiers
can influence unity in the force. As noted previously, faulty replacement
and rotation policies can have negative effects on morale, cohesion and
9
esprit. Individual replacement policies, for example, often result in
individualistic goals that detract frao unit cohesion and esprit. The
importance of enlightened unit rotation policies is critical. Soldiers need
time for rest and recuperation to escape from negative stressors, a point Seclear by Moran. 39 Moreover, time away from the battlefield allows replacement soldiers time to gain acceptance in primary groups. 40
Socialization
Socialization involves the transition that an individual urdergoes in
movirn from civilian to military societies. It includes imbuing new soldiers
with the traditions, discipline and acceptanca of leadership and authority
essential to the military. Social and physical isolation from civilian
society generally enhances the process. Historically this isolation was
prevalent. However, as modern armies grow more dependent on volunteers for
manpower there is a greater tendency to accept civilian norms in the military
society. Modern recruits tend to view the military more as an occupation
with careers and rewards and less as an institution with values and norms that transcend self interest. 41 Trainn
Frn de Saxe to Marshall, moral domain theory emphasizes the importance
of training. It shuild be as realistic as possible and provide soldiers with
a reasonably accurate idea of what to expect in canmbat. Training arms the
soldier with discipline, basic military skills, confidence and physical
stamina. Training is important in socialization and the creation of primary
groups. Battle drills, tactics, techniques and procedures facilit-Ite
teamwork and build resistance to fear in battle.
To Marshall, realistic training and its products – confidence and
10
“.1
discipline – contribute to unit cohesion. 42 Training must eniasize the
stark realities of the battlefield, the need for communication and the
importance of high volumes of well directed fire. Marshall believed that
well directed fire was decisive in battle and that training was essential to
the production of fire. The effective employment of high volumes of fire by
the majority of men in a unit was a manifestation of cohesion and individual
initiative. Based on his research, Marshall concluded that only 25% of the
soldiers in well-trained units fired their weapons in an engagement while the
army-wide average was a mere 15%. These statistics presumed that 80% of the
unit had the opportunity to engage the enemy.43 To create higher volumes
of fire, Marshall recam ended building teams around identified fighters while
placing those less prone to fire on crew-served and heavy weapons. Crews
provide moral support while responsibility for important weapons appeals to a man’s pride and desire to support his peers.44
Despite the merits of inoculating the soldier with instinctive reactions
to various situations, individual initiative must be developed in soldiers. N
.Du Picq felt that “fire by ccmmand” techniques were wasteful, generally preferring the initiative inherent in “fire at will” techniques. 45
Marshall reinforced this idea 67 years later. He firmly believed that
discipline inhibiting the initiative of thinking soldiers is self-defeating
and that soldiers with the initiative to fire remain active and move in battle. 46 Cmmnting on unity of action and initiative, Marshall stated,
“‘These two aims are not mutually exclusive; in fact, they are the complementary halves of an enlightened battle discipline.”,47
Discioline
Discipline is enforced by formal and informal means. Formal discipline
11
is maintained by the rules and regulations of military service. It generally
includes a system of punishments to influence the individual and group to
camply with the orders of superiors and rules of conduct. In times of great
trial these systems can move to the extreme with draconian measures to make
soldiers fear the onsauences of failure more than battle. uhile such methods have been effective, they usually destroy esprit. 48 Informal
sources of discipline flow from the social pressures of the primary grop.
The basic human need to belong to and maintain the trust and respect of the group are essential to this form of discipline. 49
Du Picq repeatedly emphasized the need for individual and unit discipline rooted in moral pressure and supervision. 50 Leaders served to maintain
discipline by providing cammand presence in battle. This presence sustains
unit discipline and cohesion by dcwnstrating that direction and orders
exist.
51
Leadri
In the midst of the danger and friction of battle, soldiers “exhibit a
powerful tendency toward inaction and passivity.” 52 This is when
leadership (particularly leadership by example) is most critical. Trends in
warfare have tended to force this burden lower and lower in the chain of
ommand. As Marshall pointed out, cumunication is crucial to cambat leadership. 53 Men tend tr fight when leadership is present and providing
them with clearly defined and viable courses of action. This leadership can
take the form of the establ ished chain of oummand or emergent leaders who take control in the absence of effective leaders. 54
Du Picl and Marshall placed great emphasis on the role of leaders in
sustaining cohesion under fire. Maintaining forward movement in the attack
12
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or firmness in the defense requires leaders who direct the engagement fran
the front. These leaders erploy direct caomunication and coordinate support while their presence has a calming effect on soldiers. 55 Ideolov. ,
For soldiers, ideology can be a “conscious political philosophy” and (or)
a “sense of value of their own society and its way of doing things.,,56 In
both cases ideology gives legitimacy to the cause for which soldiers fight
and the “orders given in the furtherance of the goals and interests of (their] society.” 57 While ideology is portant to the maintenance of
esprit, its greatest contribution rests in bringing the soldier to the
battlefield. Ideology helps sustain motivation over time and iqmpedes
demoralization. Leaders tend to have stronger ideological beliefs and often
inpart them to subordinates. Mass media communicatiots has gained increasing
importance with its ability to transmit beliefs and values (ideology) between
the home front and the battlefield. This is a double-edged sword that can reciprocally increase or decrease morale in both areas. 58
Most soldiers expect sane reward for their efforts and sacrifices.
Rewards take two forms: tangible and intangible. The former includes
decorations, money, miscellaneous benefits or captured booty. The latter
involves recognition in the form of parades, media publicity, or unit
formations. For many, gaining the acceptance and respect of the primary
growp may be the greatest reward of all. In any case reward systems seldom
satisfy the needs of all soldiers and can actually work against primary group
cohesion. While the effects of recognition are ephemeral, the absence of
recognition tends to have long-term negative effects on esprit. 59 De Saxe
13
demonstrated keen insight on the need for rewards by describing systems to
ensure soldiers received fair pay and promotions based on mirit. 60
Preconceptions of Canba
Shock, surprise and isolation are powerful negative stressors on men in
battle. To overcom these variables, soldiers require a reasonably accurate
picture of what they will experience prior to combat. Tough, realistic
training shapes soldiers’ preconceptions of battle, but rarely makes them
invulnerable to the shock of combat. Once under fire, interpersonal
or!tunications and the close proximity of comrades stiffen their resistance
to surprise on the battlefield. 61 XI A§•R Q./, Asoects of Comibat…,
No matter what motivational forces bring a soldier to the field of
battle, combat experience will inevitably change his motivations. Fatigue,
climate, terrain, nourishment, casualties and success (or defeat) are some
aspects of combat that support or detract from combat motivation. Strength –
in primary group cohesion, esprit, leadership and training bolster the
soldier’s resistance to the debilitating aspects of combat. Success on the
battlefield builds confidence and esprit. Failure and casualties absorbed
for little perceived gain undermine confidence in leaders and ideology.
Casualties have their greatest impact on the primary group where the loss of
respected fighters and friends tend to have profoundly negative effects on
motivation.
62
To Clausewitz, indifference to exertion and suffering is a trait soldiers
are born with or gain through training. Clausewitz believed that commanders
and leaders at all levels must recognize the mental and pkysical aspects of
exhaustion before they incapacitate the soldier and the army. Because war is
/1
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a duel between living organisms, soldiers cannot accurately predict what
their enemy will do. Consequently, most actions upon which war is based are
engulfed in a fog of uncertainty. Clausewitz believed that this area was
dcminated by the “powers of intellect” and placed a great deal of emphasis on the commander in mitigating the uncertainty of the battlefield. 6 3
Chance can change the course of a battle. In Clausewitz’ view “no other
human activity (war] gives it [chance] gniater scope; no other has such
incessant and varied dealings with this intruder.” 64 The responsibility
for overcmung the influence of chance rests with leaders. They must weigh
uncertainties and make decisions during ccmbat. Clausewitz completed Book i
with a discussion of the “atmosphere of war” and “friction.-, All those
factors that resist an army’s functions “coalesce to form the atmosphere of
war, and turn it into a medium that impedes activity.”,65 Danger, exertion
and imperfect intelligence are components of his concept of friction. He
concluded that the only way to overcome this atmosphere was combat
experience.
66
Du Picq’s concept of the effect of one army on another consisted of
material (equipment) and moral (fear) components. While the material affects
the moral, the latter is most important. By attacking or threatening attack,
one side gains a moral edg over the other; this moral superiority is crucial to defeating the enemy. 67 Du Picq recognized changes in the nature of war
and the need to adjust to them. He discerned that the increasing lethality
of weaponry would result in greater battlefield dispersion, increased soldier
isolation and wider spans of control. 68 He believed these trends created a
corresponding need to compensate for man’s instincts. Small, well-trained
units employing sound doctrine characterize his solution to the empty
15
battlefield.
69
Cam-bat X
Exposure to aspects of combat have a profound influence on soldiers over
time. Kellett subscribes to Moran’s theory that each soldier has a finite
ability to overcome the stressors that produce fear. Once a soldier has expended his ability to resist stress, he is prone to breakdown.70
Logically, extended periods of intense combat can accelerate the consumption
of resistance and rapidly bring soldiers to the breaking point. Kellett
agrees with Marshall and Moran that. a screening process can prevent many men
with personality characteristics prone to rapid breakdowns from joining combat units. 71
Clausewitz believed that the ability to function while absorbing the stress of battle required “self-control . . . rooted in teIperament.. 7 2
The ability to endure a single blow to the will is staunchness, while the
ability to endure long-term stress is endurance. The ability to overcme
eIotion is a function of balance in a soldier’s character. Clausewitz
identified four character types with regard to this balance of emotion:
stolid men not easily moved by emotion; active men who are sensitive yet
calm; excitable men yho are easily and sharply aroused for brief periods; and
men of strength and durability who are moved gradually by deep emotions. Clausewitz found most value in men of the first and last types. 73
Combat Behavo.
/.
Behavior in combat hinges on the soldier’s instinct for selfpreservation. 74 The icus decision to overcom the fear of death and vIf
act with courage is weakened or strengthened by relative commitment to “tasks levied on the individual and the group.”’75 Self-preservation, however, is
16
I1″7″, . / 1 1′ , N
a powerful motivator when no alternative to fighting is possible. This
aspect grows in importance on fluid battlefields where rear areas offer
little if any safety. Moreover, wnen leaders and primary group mesbers
demnstrate the drive to survive immediate threats, social pressures bolster
the individual’s ability to contribute to the unit’s preservation. 76 With
combat experience, soldiers gain confidence by learning how to survive. This confidence strengthens a soldier’s ability to overcome fear.77
Claus-witz asserted that courage was the first requirement to overcome
fear. He defined two types of courage in the face of danger: permanent and
situational courage. The highest form of courage was a combinatior. of both.
Permanent courage (indifference to danger) is a matter of temperament, and
the most dep.endable form. Situational courage inspires boldness and may be the result of “ambition, patriotism,. or enthusiasm of arr kind.” 78
Like Clausewitz, du Picq felt that man’s self-preservation instinct (a
basic part of human nature) was amplified by the fear, chaos and uncertainty
generated on the battlefield. The problem was reinforcing the soldier’s
courage to overcome his desire for self-preservation. Du Picq described a
myriad of interrelated factors that had to be aoccmmodated to build courage.
The most important were discipline, unit cohesion and morale. Unit
organization, tactics and leadership positively influenced those factors and
had to be addressed before a war.7
Moran felt that soldiers are born with varying ability to sustain courage
in battle.
There seemed to be four degrees of courage and four orders of men measured by that standard. Men who did not fear; men who felt fear but did not show it; men who felt fear showed ut did their job; men who felt fear showed it and shirked.it
17
1 .1, x I
Every man has a limited supply of courage that can be exhausted through
oitinutms exposure to fear in battle. 8 1 The breaking point where an
individual’s courage is exhausted is broght on by ccmnotional and (or)
emotional shock. Qommotional shock involves the external stimulus of
battle. Emotional shock refers to men frightened by their own thoughts.
While courage is not a renewable resource, leadership, training, discipline,
unit cohesion, rest and recuperation can bolster an individual’s resistance to the debilitating effects of fear.82
Like his predecessors, Marshall felt that courage was a conscious
decision to place oneself in harm’s way, despite fear. In close combat,
feelings of isolation, fear for personal safety, fear of killing, lack of
communications and unrealistic expectations of combat detracted from a
soldier’s courage and ability to function. 83 Marshall’s answer to these
negative stressors was the creation of cohesion in the primary group.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE MORAL DOMAIN OF THE GUERRT1A
Despite the importance that military theorists place on the moral domain,
none of them – save von Clausewitz who asserted that irregular forces
possessed “natural qualities” vice the “military virtues” found in regulars
– addressed differences in the moral domain corresponding to various forms
of war. Perhaps they felt that their basic parameters for the moral domain
were constant and addressed all forms of war. With the possible exception of
de Saxe, it is unlikely that they overlooked forms of conflict outside of
conventional war. Certainly they must have been aware of guerrilla wars in
history. At this point their views of the guerrilla’s moral domain, if any,
elude ts. Before applying Kellett’s factors to an analysis of the
guerrilla’s moral domain, the wars of the Yugoslav Partisans and Viet Cong
18
V,
merit review.
The Yuaoslavian Partisans, 1941-44
On 6 April 1941, German, Italian and Bulgarian troops invaded Yugoslavia.
Twelve days later Yugoslavia surrendered unconditionally. The major German
forces that blitzed through Yugoslavia departed quickly, first to Greece and
eventually to Pussia. The precipitate Axis sweep allowed many Yugoslav
soldiers to escape to the hills with their weapons, shocked and disorganized
but still capable of fighting. 84 Twenty-two unenthusiastic Italian and
four weak German divisions remainad to occupy the country. This force was
aided by the Croation “Ustashi” and ad hoc units of Serb and Muslim Slav
collaborators. 85 The rapid Axis victory was merely a prelude to a vicious
guerrilla war that would last until the invaders were evicted in 1945.
The Yugoslav resistance involved two major factions that fought each
other as well as their occupiers. The first were mainly Serbian and
Montenegrin pro-monarchists lee by Draja Mihailovich. They called themselves the “Chetniks” (“armed band”), remained loyal to the Yugoslav government in exile and conducted operations in Serbia. 86 The second group was communist
and, led by Josef Broz (“Tito”), called themselves the “Partisans.” Their
strongholds were Bosnia and eventually Croatia. 87 Both factions quickly
adopted guerrilla warfare and maximized the use of the rugged Yugoslav
countryside to resist their copressors. At the outset the Chrtniks and
Partisans could muster some 5,000 and 13,000 men, respectively. By 1944
their numbers expanded to 70,000 and 300,000.88
Fram late 1941 to mid-1943 guerrilla attacks brought harsh Axis reprisals
and more recruits from the populace. In this same period, numerous Axis
offensives failed to achieve decisive success due to guerrilla prowess and
19
Italian ineptitude. The Chetniks joined in sane of the attacks on the
Partisans.89 By the end of 1943, most Allied support went to the Partisans who were seen as the more effective force. 90
In September of 1943, the Italians quit the war and a sizeable quantity
of their equipment fell into Partisan hands. 9 1 In the fall, the
Germans employed 700,000 men in three major offensives aimed at thp
destruction of the rapidly expanding Partisan forces. Despite tactical
defeats, the Partisans survived and grew stronger. 92 In the summer of
1944, the Germarins shifted tactics and went after Tito himself. They seized
Tito’s e with airborne and ground forces, but the Partisan leader escaped to the island of Vis where he continued to direct his forces. 9 3
By the fall of 1944, most Partisan units had matured to conventional
organizations. Combined with guerrilla forces, they harried the German
retreat fran the Balkans and assisted the Soviets in the liberation of
Belgrade. By early 1945, Tito controlled 800,000 men in 53 conventionally
organized divisions. The resurgent Yugoslavian Army finished the war by
liberating their country of the .nvaders while crushing the remnants of -he Ustashi and Cietnik movements. 94
The Viet Co=c. 1960-75
The guerrilla force commonly known as the Viet Cong (VC) had its roots in
the Viet Minh forces that resisted Japanese occupiers from 1943 to 1945 and
defeated the french in the First Irdochin- War (1946-1954). From 20 July
1954 to the early ’60s, Viet Minh guerrillas remaining south of the 17th
parallel consolidated and waited for elections whi le barely surviving brutal
South Vietnamese attacks. 95 In January 1958 as Viet Minh guerrillas
stepped up attacks near Saigon, Ngo Dinh Diem, the President of the Republic
20
of Vietnam (RVN), coined the term “Viet Cong” as a moniker for the Vietnamese
Communists.96 The name stuck.
“Viet Cong” is actually an umbrella term for three organizations: the
National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF) formed in 1960; the People’s
Liberation Armed Force (PIAF); and the People’s Revolutionary Party (PRP) or
ammmunist Party of South Vietnam. 97 The NLF, predominantly South
Vietnamese, included non-ccmmunist opponents to the South Vietnamese
Government and down-played its ties to the North. In reality, the VC was
created by Northern cadres and was controlled (and largely sustained) by the
Curmunist leadership of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV or North
Vietnam). The PLAF was the military arm of the NLF, organized into Main
Force and Paramilitary units. The latter were subdivided into Regional and
Local elements. 9 8 By early 1968, the PLAF had grown to a strength of
400,000 men.99
From 1960 to 1965 the VC employed a strategy that mirrored Mao’s three
stage protracted war strategy. As the size of the Army of the Republic of
Vietnam (ARVN) expanded and the VC suffered increased attrition, the DRV
leadership hastened to reinforce the PLAF. At first, cadres and small
elements of North Vietnam’s People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) were sent south
as replacements for the PLAF. When the war escalated in the early 60s and
later with the introduction of large U.S. forces in 1965, whole regiments and
divisions of the PAW moved south to fight in concert with VC
guerrillas.
1 00
Fro 1965 through late 1967, VC guerrillas supported the PAW Regular
Force strategy .llMinating in the famous Tet Offensive of 1968. In
attempting to force a general uprising across South Vietnam, the Viet Cong
flung 70,000 men into guerrilla attacks against urban areas.I01 They were
21
bloodily repulsed. U.S. sources claimed 37,000 enemy were killed in the offensive.1 02 While attempting to recover from Tet, the Viet Cong replaced
the traditional three-stage strategy with a two-stage variant. At the
tactical level the focus moved to elite sapper teams called “super
guerrillas”. 103 Frcm 1968 until the eid of the war, the VC would play only
a suporting role to the conventional PAVN.
In the spring of 1972, the PAVN employed a conventional offensive that
was soundly defeated by U.S. air power and staunch ARVN resistance. In 1975,
the PAVN struck conventionally again and what started as limited objective
attacks exploded into a strategic offensive. In the absence of U.S. air
powmr, the PAW forces crushed the ARVN and overran South Vietnam.
Muile the Viet Cong could not win control of the South independetly,
their contribution to the PAVN victory was crucial. Despite their
catastrophic defeat in the Tet offensive, they successfully convincemd many
Americans that the South could not win. Moreover, Tet reinforced anti-war
factions that convinced an American president to forgo a bid for reelection.
Their long-term corrosive effect on the legitimacy of the RVN goverrment and
South Vietnamese morale did inestimable damage to a beleaguered nation.
The nature of the Yugoslav and Vietnamese peoples and cultures played a
key role in their respective victories. Vietnam and Yugoslavia had long
histories of nationalist fervor and violent resistance against foreign
occupation. The masses of both countries were ethnically, politically and
religiously diverse. Yugoslav and Vietnamese people were used to hardships.
Poverty and war forged stoic and fatalistic attitudes in both cultures. On
the way to victory, both guerrilla movements maximized their useful cultural
attributes while overcuming their negatives. Protracted war, nested in the
22
i l’ , .< 7
Vietnamese culture’s long term (Eastern) view of time, was one example.
Appeals to nationalism were another.
Factors Affecting the Horal Domain and the Guerrilla
Imnortance of the Primary Group
Early in the Yugoslavian resistance Tito’s Partisans were formed in
guerrilla bands built around nuclei of committed ccmtinists. 104 These
small bards of varying sizes (often three guerrillas) were grouped into small
platoons and companies as fast as recruitment allowed. 105 Named after their leaders or localities, Partisan units were raised regionally.1 06
Clans and villages provided manpower and injected their friendships, bonds,
and biases into the Partisan ranks. Despite their ad hoc formulation, it is
clear that these bands formed the primary groups of the movement. Partisan
tactics relied heavily on the enployment of small units conducting sabotage,
raids and ambtushes. Inevitably, the very nature of these tactics placed
great importance upon the effectiveness of the primary group. While the
formation of three-man primary groups (bands) was not standardized in the
Partisan movement, the Viet Cong built an entire guerrilla ermy on the
standardized organization of three-man cells.
The Viet Cong formed three-man guerrilla cells (primary groups), led by
an experienced cadre member, soon after new recruits were gathered for
training. Cell, platoon and company cadres led and trained their cells from conception through combat. 107 This practice inevitably fostered small unit
cohesion and provided valuable training for the leaders themselves. The
critical importance of this organization stemmed from:
(1) its function as a “buddy group” capable of satisfying basic needs; (2) its domination by the cadre-leader which ensured that primary group norms would be congruent with organizational objectives; (3) its utility as a basic mechanism for surveillance
23
/ N
and as a source of reports on irdividual behavior; and (4) its slitabili as a unit capable of enrgaging in modern guerrilla warfare.
The Viet Cong’s standardization of the primary group was a critical factor in
their resilience and endurance. The nature of their primary groups permeated
all facets of their organization. Arguably, the organization of these
guerrilla cells made it possible for them to fight the war for as long and as
successfully as they did. 109 Appendices I and 2 illustrate the primary
group concept embodied in the Viet Cong organizational structure.
Unit Esprit
Both the Partisans and Viet Cong employed dedicated leaders to canalize
the efforts of the primary group in the adlievement of their movement goals.
Because the Partisans had to rely on a much broader base of support, their
leaders were less hcmogencus in terms of political affiliation and goals.110 Despite this fact, the overriding objective – freeing their
nation from Axis oppression – provided ample focus for unit esprit.
Viet Cong cadre leaders focused the efforts of the primary group to
achieve Party and PEA goals (the higher cause).111 Through the employment
of the three-man cell, “the PLA structured and controlled the primary group
to a degree equaled in few armies.” 12 These cells, well integrated into
the structure of higher echelons, were crucial to Viet Cong esprit. Ideology
and socialization contributed to primary group cohesion and PLA control over
the primary cell.
Mancr Allocation
The Partisan movement never suffered from a lack of volunteers. They
drew heavily from former members of the Yugoslav army while Axis brutality
pushed vast numbers of men and women into the movement’s fighting ranks.
24
‘, / ,'”. .. / f
Appeals for the cause of national liberation were made to all minorities and
guerrilla units were often raised along ethnic lines. Women’s and youth
organizations were formed to support fighting units.1 13 Service in the
Partisan ranks was voluntary and some guerrillas were allowed to leave the movement when they no longer wanted to participate.1 14
As mentioned previously, Partisan bands were organized into platoons,
campanies and detachments. Eventually, selected detachments were joined to
form mobile Proletarian brigades and divisions. While logistics and support
units were established, all guerrilla units were expected to (and did) fight
as required. Leaders (to include Tito himself) fought alongside guerrilla
units, obviating divisions between leaders and fighters. In the early stages “)
of the war guerrilla tactics preduminated, but in the later stages pitched
battles along conventional lines grew in frequency. Fighting in larger
organizations, Partisan units experienced longer battles in greater
frequency with fewer breaks than the Viet Cong.
From the early days of the movement until the mid ’60s, the preferred
method of Viet Cong recruitment involved subtle persuasion and coercion. I Impressionable youth were prime targets of this approach. 1 15 However, as
the war intensified, conscription and abduction increased as methods of
gaining maypoer. 116 While some recruits were pramised three-year
cammitments upon entry, they were often coerced into “service until
victory.” 117 Women accounted for a significant portion of VC strength and
their presence could galvanize the will of male guerrillas. 118 Woman and
men recruited for the Viet Cong usually started service in local units and,
when they proved reliable, moved on to Regional and Main Force
organizations. 119 This process, when carried out, allowed new soldiers to
25 7
1.7 /
-7..
gather experience while providing cadre members with ample opportunity to
select potential leaders and useful fighters. Enlightened Viet Cong rest and
recuperation practices allowed many units to remain out of direct contact
with enemy ground units. The participation of combat leaders (and political
cadres) in all activities as well as the rotation of guerrilla units between
combat, political and logistics missions mitigated most feelings of division
in the ranks. Socializato
Guerrilla recruits experienced a socialization process similar to that
employed by conventional forces. Discipline, the •cceptance of authority and
guerrilla training facilitated socialization. However, the Partisans and, to
a lesser extent, the Viet Cong depended on the support of the local I”, population. Therefore, unlike most conventional forces, isolation from the
civil populace was An productive for the guerrillas. Within the ranks of
the Viet Cong, the prniary group and the progressive advancement of capable
guerrillas to the Main Force provided useful vehic es for the transition from
civilian to military life. The same was true of the Partisan system where
guerrillas moved from local bands and reional detacments to mobile
Proletarian brigades and divisions.
Viet Cong indoctrination, epihasizing NLF ideology as well as traditional
Vietnamese values and characteristics, played a salient role in the
socialization process. Indoctrination was just as important to Partisan
socialization; however, it emphasized nationalism due to the political and
ethnic-regional diversity of their movement. Partisan and Viet Cong recruits
were treated with respect and care by their leaders. This genuine concern
for the welfare of guerrillas built trust and confidence in the leadership.
26
.. . i .. i i /
The importance of training was never overlooked by the Viet Cong or the
Partisans. The problem for both movements was inconsistent and uneven
training. Viet Cong training was situationally dependent. For example, at
one point in 1966, the 514th Viet Cong Battalion spent only eight days
training new guerrillas on rudimentary fighting skills before sending them
into battle. When time permitted, they enployed a 30-day training cycle that
included advanced skills. 12 0 Some progran lasted up to three months and
featured live operations due to the fact that they often conducted training
during combat missions.121 Since most guerrillas started in local units
and progressed to Regional and Main Force elements, training would continue
at each level.
All Viet Cong training emphasized political indoctrination and a great
amount of time was spent on the process. Indoctrination training was
conructed on the march and in lulls between battles.122 Another area of
emphasis was weapons proficiency. Viet Cong marksmanship manuals stressed
many of the same cnncepts that Marshall believed were so important. Maximum
participation by unit members and high volumes of well-aimed fire were just as important to VC guerrillas as they were to conventional infantry. 12 3
Written by Tito himself, Partisan basic training requirements emphasized
basic marksmanship, small unit drills, and demolitions. Following initial
setbacks, Tito ordered all cammanders to refrain from seniing untrained leaders into cxbat.12 4 Early on, entry training lasted two weeks;
however, as casualties mounted and inexperienced personnel joined the ranks,
training increased to six weeks.125 Eventually Tito directed the
establishment of two commanx courses lasting ten days each. The first was
27
designed for battalion and brigade leaders while the second was designed for platoon and cqmpany comarders.126 Disciplin
Discipline was a subject that Tito emphasized in orders to the
Partisans. For example, the oath taken by new Partisans and the order establishing Proletarian brigades stressed the importance of discipline.127
“Iron self discipline” was supposed to spring from the guerrilla’s political
caivictions, conscience and devotion to victory. 128 To enforce discipline,
Tito established military courts and magistrates. Punishment ranged from public aInishment for minor offenses to death for cowardice and treason. 129
7he hand-picked and better-led mambers of mobile units appeared to
demonstrate more discipline than local guerrillas. However, while discipline
under fire does not appear to have been a major problem, excesses outside
combat were. Civilians of various ethnic groups were often at the mercy of ,
guerrillas from different origins. This is an example of primary groups
working against the higher cause. The mistreatment (often execution) of
captured Chetniks and Axis soldiers was commonplace despite Tito’s orders to
the contrary.
130
Viet Cong guerrillas indicate that discipline in many units was
situationally dependent, sometimes uraconian, but most often affected through
a lenient system of moral persuasion. Occasionally, minor transgressions
were punished by execution, but most offenders were subjected to simple
counseling and reeducation. Sane Viet Cong deserters (incldxling multiple
offenders) recovered by their units were simply placed back in the ranks.
Such leniency depended on the attitude of the unit cadre; however, its
existence certainly dispels the image of routinely brutal discipline.
28
Apparently, the need for acceptance and respect from the primary group was the most important factor in Viet Cong combat discipline. 13 1 Leadership
In the Partisan and Viet Cong movements, dedicated leaders were decisive ‘
in maintaining cohesion and accomplishing missions. Acting as conduits of
esprit, teachers, role models and combat leaders, unit cadres were the glue
that held the guerrilla units together. Much of the Viet Cong leadership
consisted of former Viet Minh while many Partisan leaders were veterans of
the Spanish Civil War. 13 2 In both cases they brought a wealth of ccm)lt
experience to their movements.
Mwt guerrillas (particularly Viet Cong) had great confidence and trust
in their leaders. Of particular note is the fact that Viet Cong and Partisan
Cadres led from the front and endured all the privations experienced by their
subordinates.133 Viet Cong guerrillas held their leaders in high esteem
for their experience, bravery and prowess in battle. 134 This held true for the Viet Cong political cadres that periodically toured guerrilla cells. 13 5
Ideolory
The ideologies of the Partisan and Viet Cong movements were based on
appeals to nationalism for similar reasons. Given the political and ethnic
diversity of Yugoslavia, the Partisans had little choice. In August of 1941
Tito wrote:
The Partisan detachments are called national liberation partisan detachments because they are not fighting units belonging 7 to any particular political party . . \. rather they are fighting units of the nations of Yugoslavia which ought to be joined by all patriots capable of bearing arms again the invaders, regardless of their political convictions-.13 6
Mhe Partisan ideology essentially called for a national crusade to evict the
29
“—-…. ..-.. — ” .. .
Axis occupiers. Moreover, old Balkan traditions – guerrilla warfare and
acts of banditry against oppressive governments – combined with nationalism
formed a potent motivating force. 137 Despite some misgivings by hardened
communists, this broad-based approach was rapidly accepted and carried the
nvrement throughout the war. Tito’s call for unity had the added benefit of
discrediting the Chetniks who collaborated with the Axis and attacked the
Partisans. Moreover, this nationalist ideology was instrumental in
attracting Western support.
Both conscious political philosophy and the values of Vietnamese society
were the bedrock of Viet Cong ideology. Cell leaders and political cadres
imbued guerrillas with NLF ideology, employing a broad-based appeal to
acoamcdate the wide spectrum of recruits. The four major points of the NLF
ideology reflect this approach.
(1) to save the nation (that is, save it “from U.S. agressors”); (2) to work for reunification of the fatherland; (3) to build an independent, democratic, peaceful, neutral, and prosperous Vietn 1 and (4) to apply a foreign policy of “peace and neutrality.”
Values of Vietnamese society contributed to the overall NLF ideology. These
values included independence and nationalism as well as cultural
characteristics such as “fatalism, respect for elders, face (pride, ego,
respect) and the Vietnamese view of death.” 1 39 The nationalistic appeal
was designed to disguise Viet Cong connections with the DRM from independent
minded South Vietnamese and the rest of the world. This was particularly
important because many meters of the NLF were not comitted cmimunists.
Guerrilla ideology was not without weakness and could be a double-edged
sword when effectively discredited. NUmerous Viet Cong defectors cited their
loss of faith in the ideology as a motive for giving up the fight.
30
I.
Psychological warfare – employed to convince guerrillas that life was better
on the other side – and the effectiveness of advanced American weaponry were
instrumental in producing this loss of faith.140
Rewards for members of both movements were mostly of the intangible
type. Other than rank or the “National Hero Award” (presented for acts of
heroism) Partisan guerrillas had few rewards to win. 141 Viet Cong cadre
members promised “not only glory, respect, freedom fran want but adventure, education, jobs, land reform and an end to corruption in government.”‘142
Personal publicity during unit formations and dispatches could be won in both
movements. For most, the respect and admiration of the primary group was all
the guerrillas could really expect. Mhe Viet Cong and Partisans appeared to
fight without any type of pay. However, bounties (in the form of money or
rice farms) were occasionally offered to Viet Cong guerrillas for the death
or capture of enemy officers and Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP)
soldiers.
1 4 3
Preconceptions of Ccmbat
The Partisan and Viet Cong approaches to mitigating the shock, surprise
and isolation that guerrillas experienced during their introduction to battle
ware uneven at best. While the strength of the primary group alleviated some
of the stress frcm isolation, the shock and surprise of battle were difficult
to overcom. Since training was situationally dependent, the task was made –
even more difficult. Lectures by leaders with cmbat experience were
important and helped to same extent, but little could be done to prepare the
guerrillas for the cataclysmic attacks of Panzers and Stukas or B-52s and
helicopters. As with the conventional soldier, surviving the first big fight k
31
N • [
p.–
was the guerilla’s typical path to realistic expectations of cambat.
Aspects of Ccmbat
Partisan and Viet Cong guerrillas were burdened by the same basic aspects
of c •mbat that impact on conventional soldiers. However, the shortage of
many basic sup•lies amplified these hardships. Partisan acounts of the war
do not aqphasize specific aspects of cxmbat that diminished their will to
fight, bWt weakness in the face of enemy air power and armor clearly
disturbed them. Furthermore, Partisan accounts reveal a willingness to avoid
combat with the better German units when appropriate. Elite German units
called jagdkmmandos (Hunting Commandos) created significant problems for the
guerrillas. Infiltrating deep into guerrilla sanctuaries, these units tracked the Partisans and vectored heavier combat units in for attacks. 144
The other Axis forces (particularly the Italians) did not appear to strike as
much fear in the Partisans.
The threat of certain weapons appeared to have a greater impact than
others on the Viet Cong guerrilla’s will to fight. They experienced a
feeling of helplessness when attacked by weapons they had little power to
defeat. Fixed-wing aircraft and, to a lesser extent, helicopters and
artillery were especially frightening to the guerrillas. The B-52 was
particularly devastating to Viet Cong morale, not only because of its
physical effects but almost as significantly because of surprise. These huge
bcmbers flew so high that no warning preceded strikes. While the heavy
casualties, shock and surprise inflicted by these weapons occurred most often
in contact, the Viet Cong seldom felt safe knowing they could be hit anytime,
anywhere, with no warning. Xurcraft, with their killing and surveillance
capabilities, constrained Viet Cong tactics and forced them to execute
32
—- N -.—.
exhausting evasive movements. 14 5
While the threat always existed, Viet Cong guerrillas appeared to have
far less fear of combat with enemy ground forces because they felt they had
roughly equal capebilities. 14 6 The exceptions were units like MRRPs that
actively hunted them. 14 7 A novelty of the war in Vietnam was the heavy
e1ployment of defoliants. The effects of these chemicals on crops, health and sanctuaries added to Viet Cong fears and feelings of helplessness 148
Douglas Pike summarized how these aspects of combat affected the moral domain
of the Viet C-ng when he stated:
The resulting sense of isolation was what distinguished the mentality of the guerrilla from that of the regular soldier; the psychology of. the two was profoundly different. For the guerrilla there was no home front; the enemy, more numerous and powerful than he, was everywhere. The sense of being h4 unted animal was never far below his level of consciousness.
Combat Stress
Combat stress was an active factor in the moral domain of the guerrillas;
however, it was mitigated by the nature of the way they fought. By design,
protracted guerrilla warfare involved small numbers of pitched battles spread
over long periods of time.150 In practice the average Viet Cong unit was
exposed to full-scale engagements only a few times a year. Thus most of the guerrillas avoided the stress of continuous ombat. 15 1
Once in battle, superior enemy firepower often inflicted what Moran
called “ccummotional shock” and many Viet Cong were rendered ineffective (with
many deserting) because of single traumatic engagements. Viet Cong leaders
understood the effects of combat stress and tried to provide rest periods of
15 days or more to units involved in tough fighting. These rest periods
emphasized the cadre in “raising the morale, mobilizing the spirit, or
33
/p
, \\ /I
correcting the thoughts of the fighters before an engagement or after a
defeat.”‘152 The time allowed for rest and recuperation certainly
contribited to the long-term endurance of the Viet Cong.
In the early stages of the Yugoslav resistance guerrilla tactics
prI-minated, but in the later stages pitched battles along conventional
lines grew in frequency. Fighting in larger organizations, Partisan units
experienced longer battles with greater frequency than those experienced by
the Viet Cong.. Therefore, their exposure to combat stress was closer in
nature to that exV-renced by conventional soldiers. However, unlike the
Viet Cong or conventional soldiers, the voluntary nature of the Partisan
i,
moveient allowed many guerrillas to retire when they were spent. CombatBeair Z .
Few would argue that Partisan and Viet Cong guerrillas often performed
incredible acts of bravery in the face of formidable enemies. For the
guerrilla, mere survival in pitched battles could be considered a victory of
sorts. Depending on their tactical situation and mission, flight in the face
of the enemy was not necessarily a cowardly act. However, this is not to say
that the guerrillas did not demonstrate acts of cowardrice; in many cases thr/y
did.
While the guerrilla’s will to fight appears to have been heavily
influenced by the previously mentioned factors, the self-preservation
instinct inherent in acst soldiers probably dominated his combat behavior.
Whether cucting raids, executing ambushes or hiding in some form of
sanctuary, guerrillas often fought as a means of survival. They often had no
alternative when enem air power and ground forces like IMRPs or
adk-CEMdos could hunt them throxghout the countryside.
34
; ,
‘1 – ~ .
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The strongest conclusion of this monograph is that Kellett’s factors
affecting combat motivation do apply to the guerrilla. However, while the
basic construct is applicable, the nature of some of the factors is
significantly different.
In an holistic sense, the guerrilla’s moral damain may be the single most
important ingredient in their bid for victory. Unlike conventional warfare
where armies can cca•pnsate (to some degree) for weaker wills with greater
resources and technology, guerrilla warfare remains a people-intensive
affair. War focused on the human element inevitably relies heavily on
victory in the moral domain.
The role of the primary group is more important in guerrilla forces
(particularly those employing the cell concept) than it is in most
conventional armies. These basic building blocks form the bedrock upon which
the entire guerrilla structure is created. The strength of the primary group
is a critical factor in the resilience and endurance of the guerrilla. The
creation of cohesive primary groups is almost an organizational imperative
for guerrillas while conventional organizations can survive and win without
the same emphasis.
The guerrilla’s ideology, closely linked to esprit, plays a significant
role in guerrilla armies. Indoctrination, emphasizing political ideology, is
a salient feature of guerrilla training and plays a pivotal role in bringing
the guerrilla to the battlefield. Focused by politically astute J aders,
guerrilla esprit is generated from guerrilla ideology and group goals. In
comparison, the esprit of conventional soldiers originates more from unit
traditions and societal values than a conscious political orientation.
35
*
., ” . .• -.- , !/
The transition from civilian to military life is different for the
guerrilla because the mechanisms of change are less abrupt than those
molding conventional soldiers. Furthermore, the socialization process in
guerrilla armies cannot afford to be isolated fran the populace because
guerrilla movements depend heavily on civilian support.
In terms of manpower allocation the guerrilla sees his organization as
far more hcmogenous than his conventional counterpart. Guerrilla leaders and
supporting troops at all levels share the hardships of battle to a degree
inconceivable in conventional armies. While senior guerrilla leaders may
engage in fire fights, the senior leaders of conventional armies fight their
wars from cities or command posts in relative security. Similarly,
supporting troops in guerrilla organizations are never far frac the effects
of their antagonist’s firepower.
A significant difference between the manpower allocation policies of guerrilla and conventional armies resides in the participation of women.
Guerrilla armies have never hesitated to employ women directly in combat.
Of interest is the fact that their presence strenghtened the resolve of some
male guerrillas. The debate over the role of women in combat is beyond the “\
scope of this paper; however, the fact that guerrilla forces actively and
effectively employ females in combat roles differentiates this form of war.
While similarities exist between guerrilla and regular army emphasis on
training, significant differences prevail. Guerrilla forces are limited by
inferior training resorces. This is particularly true of training
facilities, equipnent. and ammunition. These differences can be mitigated if
the training takes place in a secure area like a foreign country. Cceared
to most conventional organizations, ideological training receives vastly
36
<. . – . -, -” / ‘ ‘7
greater attention in guerrilla armies.
Leadership and discipline are as important to the guerrilla as they are
for regular soldiers. Leadership in guerrilla and conventional forces has
nearly identical functions in combat. However, the guerrilla leader must
rely on personal, up-front techniques required by infantry intensive
tactics. Conventional light infantry leaders employ similar methods but the
similarities drop off in units built around mechanization. Moreover,
significant differences exist off the battlefield where guerrilla leaders
play a greater role in the indoctrination, initial training and discipline of
subordinates. Discipline rooted in primary group societal pressures affects
the guerrilla in a manner similar to the way it impacts on the conventional
soldier. However, the uneven enforcement of formal disciplinary action in
guerrilla forces is different. Punishment for similar offenses can vary from
subtle coercion and persuasion to execution.
Unlike his conventional counterpart, the guerrilla has little reason to
expect any tangible rewards other than personal decorations. Intangible
rewards in the from of recognition and the respect of the primary group are
all he can hope for.
Despite differences in tactics, guerrillas and conventional soldiers
endure similar experiences in relation to cambat. Both suffer from
unrealistic preconceptions of battle. These erroneous preconceptions usually
remain until their first taste of cambat. Hardships, fatigue, fear and
isolation are active factors for both types of soldiering. However,
guerrillas often stnrggle with the fear of engaging an enemy who possess
weaponry against which they have few good defenses. Combat stress detracts
frum the will of both groups. Value conflicts that roam the soldier’s psyche
37
• – . –…- .,.I – .- ” , • I•
are similar. Killing versus humanity, duty versus self-preservation and
ideology versus reality buirden the guerrilla and the regular. Perhaps the 7
streng~th of ideology, com~bined with primary group dynamics and reinforced by
a politicized cadre, gives the guerrilla an edge in overcomng stress.
Kellett’s factors as well as most of the classical mo~ral domiain theory
provide useful and valuable tools for the analysis of the guerrilla s
dcmiain. Hoywever, important issues reside in the implications for
counterguerrilla doctrine.
V. pa
To effectively counter guerrilla warfare, we muzst understand guerrilla
strengths aid ,Ailnerabilities. From this monograph we can draw two
implications about guerrilla vulnerabilities. The first implication involves
ideology while the secod involves technology. A third iz~lication can be
drawn from our doctrine’Is treatment of the guerrilla’s moral domain.
Despite the great efforts that guerrilla leaders expend imbuing their
soldiers with ideology, the guerrilla’s faith in the cause can be broken. A
traditional focus of psychological operations in counterguerrilla warfare is
the subject of legitimacy. Legitimnacy revolves around the citizenry’s
acceptance of their governmient or leadership. Historically, revolutionary
guerrillas target this bond between the populace aid the government they wish
to replace. Conversely, the struggle for legitimacy aid the guerrilla’s
dependence on the populace have tended to focus psychological operations of
counterguerrilla warfare on separating the guerrilla from the people. While
this is a useful endeavor, the guerrillas themelves should be attacked as
well. Discrediting a movement ‘s ideology appears to have extremely negative
effects on the guerrilla’s moral domain. Therefore a considerable portion of
38
psychological operations should be directed at breaking the guerrilla’s
belief in his (or her) cause.
Today our government is makmng hard choices in the area of weapons
procurement. Conventional wisdao criticizes the wastefulness and lack of
utility found in high technology weapons designed for the cold war. However,
given the experience of the Viet Cong and Partisans, high technology weapons
appear to have great utility in ounterguerrilla warfare. High technology
weapons have proved to have a degrading effect on guerrilla morale.
High technology system – stealth bombers, precision guided munitions
and advanced reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA)
equipment – could reward their users with high pay-offs when enployed to
threaten much of the sanctuary the guerrilla seeks. Like the B-52 and Stuka,
skillful use of these weapons could devastate a guerrilla movement’s moral I domain. Furthermore, given the guerrilla’s vulnerability to units like LURPs 7
and Jaqdkcmmandos, the synergy of Special Operations Forces and precision
guided weapons should be exploited. Inevitably the use of these weapons
would be influenced by the specific nature of the guerrilla movement and the
physical characteristics of the area of operations.
The guerrilla of course, will strive to avoid precision attacks by’
hugging population centers. However, these tactics carnnot entirely avoid
high technology precision strikes. While guerrillas may hide portions of N>
their organization in urban areas, a move of this nature may constrain their
activities and expose other vulnerabilities.
Doctrine derived from theory provides an army with a foundation for
training and organization. Evolving doctrine is an army’s mechanism of
change. If we expect our counterguerrilla doctrine to be useful we must
39
– /7.
ensure that it is fully imbued with the concepts of accepted theory.
Therefore, moral daoain theory should form part of the foundation of our
counterguerrilla doctrine.
Army formations preparing for contingencies involving guerrilla warfare
should look to Field Manual 90-8. Counterguerrilla MOerations as a point of ,
departure. As written, the manual provides a multitude of tactics, /
techniques and procedures for fighting the guerrilla in the physical andr
cybernetic dcmains. The manual, however, pays scant attention to the will of
the guerrilla in ccmnbat. For example, under the heading of ‘Notivation and
discipline,” FM 90-8 states:
The guerrilla leaders are trained and motivated. They reinforce motivation within the guerrilla force through the immediate application of discipline. Usually the ggrilla is devoted to a cause almost to the point of fanaticism.
The contents of this paragraph are indicative of the attention given to the
moral domain of the guerrilla throughout the manual. Our current
counterguerrilla doctrine’s treatment of the moral domain is not sufficient.
The implication is clear: our doctrine should explore vulnerabilities of the
guerrilla’s moral domain in greater detail.
No matter how convincingly our senior leaders state that we will
carefully choose our wars, the prerogative will not belong to the military.
In facing the challenges of the post – Cold War environment, our armed forces
must maintain the capability to fight and win any form of conflict.
Ubiquitous in recent history, guerrilla warfare deserves the attention of our
military. Counterguerrilla tactics have already been explored in great
detail by a myriad of theorists. However, victory in the moral dcmain may be
the key to beating the guerrilla. The moral domain of the guerrilla has
escaped close scrutiny and remains a fertile area for further study.
40
• . I -A ,/
,/ //
Appendix 1 (Organization of the People’s Liberation Armed Force154)
PEOPLE’S REVOLUONARY PARIY OF SOUM VIEINAM (PRP)
THE NATIONAL LIBEATION FROM OF SOUM VWEIW (NLF)
P MPLE’ S LIBMATION AM~ED FORCE (IF EOL
MAIN FORCE PARAMILMARY GUERILLAS URMA
x x x III I I
(outryside) (villages)
KUN FORCE GERJ~RfIA UNITS (see Appeix 2)
II I … Man cell
(three-man cells below platoon level)
41
/ ], . . ,. .
Appendix 2 (Three-by-Three Organization of PLA Main Force Units 1 55 )
VIEM CNG MAIN FORCE DIVISION
II IIl III IIl III
II I I Il I ,
BA I II I .I I l I I I Ii
II I II
I I I I
SMD JrI[I * * Jr
3-MAN CEL 3-MN =LY 3-MN CELL
42
-I/ /
‘Anthony Kellett, Comba-t. Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers in Combat (Boston: Kluwer Nijhof Publishing, 1982), 319. 2Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 136. 3 Janes J. Schneider, Interview by Cpt. Daniel L. Zajac, 12 August 1992, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Camuand and General Staff College, Fort Leaavernth, Ks.
4HQ Department of the Army, Field Manual 26-2. Management of Stress in Army Operations (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 3.
5Kellett, 6.
6U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publi~cation 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and AssociatAd Terms (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 161 and 383. 7 Ibid., 383 and 161.
8HQ Department of the Army, Field Manual 90-8. Counterguerrilla / Operations (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 2-1. 9Arthur Campell, Guerrillas: A History and Analysis from Napoleon’s
Time to the 1960s (New York: the John Day Co., 1968), 3. 10Gerard Chailand, ed., Guerrilla Strategies: an Historical Analysis from the Long March to Afqhanistan (Berkeley: University of Southern California Press, 1982), 10.
“llMaurice de Saxe, My Reveries Upon the Art of War, in Roots of gtatemy: The 5 Greatest Military Classics of All Time, trans. and ed. Brig. Gen. Thoaas R. Phillips (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1985), 190-192. 1 2Clausewitz, 185. 1 3Ibid., 104.
14Ibid., 186.
15Ardant du Picq, Battle Studies, trans. John N. Greely and Major Robert C. Cotton, in Roots of Strateov Book 2: 3 Military Classics (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1987), 65-66. 16 1bid., 65.
17 Ibid., 137.
18Lord Moran, The Anatomy of Courage (New York: Avery Publishing
43
Group, Inc., 1987), xv. 1 9 Ibid., 61 and 53. 20 S.L.A. Marshall,. Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle COiuand in Future (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1978), 27. 2 1 Ibid., 12.
22Ibid., 210.
23Kellett, 319. 24(ju picq, 122.
2 5 Kelett, 320-321.
261rsall, 41.
27Ibid., 42.
28Ibid., 149.
29kellett, 321.
30du Picc, 121.
31de Saxe, 241-242.
32Ibid., 194.
33Kellett, 322. 3 4 ibid. 35 Clausewitz, 189. 36 Ibid., 187-188.
3 7Ibid., 188. 38 1bid., 101.
39Mran, 71.
40Kellett, 323. 4 1 1bid., 324.
4 2Marshall, 23 ard 41.
44
431bid., 50-54 and 132. Roger J. Spiller, the Deputy Director of the / Caobat Studies Institute, US Army Cammand And General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth Kansas, has done significant research on Marshall and his ratio of fire. While Spiller agrees with many of Marshall’s theories, he persuasively disputes the validity of Marshall’s ratio of fire. In particular, Spiller highlights evidence suggesting that Marshall made no systematic attempt to ask soldiers if they fired their weapons in an engagement. Furthermore, he points out that Marshall’s personal correspondence and private conversations reveal an absence of comnents on the ratio of fire. Roger J. Spiller, “S.L.A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire.” RUSI Journal 133 (Winter 1988): 68. In another study directly related to Marshall ‘s ratio of fire, Maj Russell W. Glenn conducted a survey of Vietnam veterans to determine if “American soldiers put out an effective volume of small arms fire” in Vietnam. Russell’s research indicated that an average of greater than 80% of the soldiers in units fired their weapons during engagements in the Vietnam War. Russell W. Glenn, “Men Against Fire in Vietnam.” (School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, U.S. Army CamTend and General Staff College, 1987), 39.
44Ibid., 57 and 74-76.
45Du Picq, 195-199 and 264–286. 4 6Marshall, 81-83 and 134-136. 47 Ibid., 133. 4 8Kellett, 327. 4 9Ibid., 326.
50du Picq, 122.
5 1 Ibid., 167. 5 2Kellett, 326.
5 3Marshall, 130.
54Kellett, 327-329.
5 5MWarshall, 132; and du Picq, 183. 5 6Kellett, 327. 57 ibid.
5 8 Ibid., 328.
5 9 ibid.
45
S ,/
\A
60eSaxe, 194-201.
6 1 Kellett, 328-329. 62 .hid., 329-330.
63C0ausewitz, 101.
64bic&. 6 2Ibid. 122.
663bid.
6 7 lu si , tj 149 .
“6Ibid., 124. 6 9 Ibid., 186. A
7 0Moran, xvi; and Kellett, 331. 7 1Kellett, 330-331; Marshall, 211; and Moran, 152-153.
72Clausewitz, 106.
7 3 Ibid., 105-107.
74du Picq, 66 and 120. 75Kellett, 331.
76Kellett, 331-332; and Marshall, 138. 77du Picq, 131; Marshall, 207; and Kellett, 332.
78Clausewitz, 101.
7 9du Picq, 65-66, 72-74 aid 120-127.
“8N omran, 3.
82Moran, xvi and 63 and; du Picx, 140.
82 Ibid., 18-22 and 70-71.
83Marshall addresses variables that inpact on the combat behavior of soldiers throughcut his book. He specifically explains the effects of unrealistic expectations of battle on pages 36-37; isolation on pages 44-48; fear of killing on page 78; and comnunications on pages 100-101. Similar ideas are spread throughout du Picq’s Battle Studies.
46
\~
-“”• . ..– ‘” .-.
“7 .1
• •
8 4Richard Rustin, “Tito and His Partisan Army: Yugoslavia, 1941-45,,” Stratecy and Tactics 81 (July/August 1980): 5. 8 5Ibid., 5-6.
86H Department of the Army, Pamphlet No. 20-260. German Antiquerrilla Operations in the Balkans (1941-1944) (Washirnton: U.S. Governmwent Printing Office, 1954), 20-21. 8 7 Ibid., 20-21. 8 8rmtin1 9. 89 Phyllis Autey, “qhe Rise of Tito,” in History of the Second World J War, ed. Sir Basil Liddell Hart and Barrie Pitt (London: BPC Publishing Ltd., 1966), 1399-1400.
90Earl F. Ziemrke, “Clearing the Balkans,” in History of the Second World Wa•, ed. Sir Basil Liddell Hart and Barrie Pitt (London: BPC Publishing Ltd., 1966), 2153. 9 1Ibid., 2153. 9 2 HQ Department of the Army, Pamphlet 20-260, 49-50.
9 3Ibid., 65-66. 94ltn 8-9. ” 9 5 Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: a History (New York: The Viking Press, 1983; reprint, New York: Penguin Books, 1984), 226-227. 9 6 Ibid., 230. 9 7Douglas Pike, War, Peace and the Viet Conq (Navoto: Presidio Press, 1969), 1-2. “9 8Ibid., 1-2.
” 9 9Douglas Pike, PAVN: People’s Army of Vietnam (Navoto: Presidio Press, 1986), 48. 10 0 Ibid., 48.
10 1Pike, War. Peace and the Viet Q, 126-128.
10 2Michael Maclear, -The Ten Thousand Day War Vietnam: 1945-1975 (New York: St. Martin’s Press., 1981), 204. 10 3 Pike, PAVN, 226-228.
47
N/ __ __ __ ‘ -_ _, ! ‘
* * * .. ‘—-‘-v-4-*.
104 paul Hehn, The German Strui le Against the Yugoslav Guerrillas in World War IT: German Counter-InsurQency in Yuctoslavia, 1941-1943 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 11. 10 5 F. Trgo, M. Lekovic, M. Bojic, and V. Klajakovic, Tito’s Historical Decisio (Belgrade: Naradna Armija, 1980), 29. 106M Department of the Army, Pamnrilet No. 20-260, 31.
1 07 David W. P. Elliot ard Mai Elliot, Documents of an Elite Viet .Cong Unit: The Demolition Platoon of the 514th Battalion-Part Four: Political Indoctrination and Military Training (Santa Monica: the Rand Corporation, 1969) ,ix and 7; and William Henderson, Why the Viet Cong Fought: A Study of Motivation and Control in a Modern Army. (Westport Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), 40-43.
108Henderson, 120-121.
1 09M=n Knoebl, Victor Charlie: The Face of War in Vietnam (New York: Frederick A. Pr-aeger Publishers, 1967), 12.
1 10 i•1o, lekovic, Bojic, and Kljakovic, 28.
lllHenderson, 121. 11 2 Ibid., 40. 1 1 3Auty, 1397.
11 4Milovan Djilas, Wartime (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1977), 157. ll5j~~n C. Donnell, Viet Cong Recruitment: Why and How Men Join (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1967), xvi-xvii. 1161bid., Vii..
1 17 Ibid., 11-12. 11 8David W. P. Elliot and Mai Elliot, Documents of an Elite Viet Cong Unit: The Demolition Platoon of the 514th Battalion-Part Five: Personal S(Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1969), 2-3. 11 9 1bid., x.
12M. Anderson, M. Arnsten, and H. Averch, InsurQent OrQanization and Operations: A Case Study of the Viet Con= in the Delta, 1964-66 (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1967), 157. 12 1Elliot, and Elliot, 6-8.
48
122Eliot, and Elliot, ix.
123u. s. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, “ST 67-064 VC/NVA Techniques of Small Arms Fire,” in Records of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Part 2, Classified Studies from the Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam 1965-73, ed. Robert E. Lester (Bethesda: University Publications of America, 1988, text-fiche), pp. 1-3, 25/2F:012 – 25/2F:015.2.
124Josip Broz Tito, Josip Broz Tito: Military Thoucht and Works: Selected Writings (1936-1979) trans. rAfsan Isakovibc, Kordija Kveder, and Milan Paramakovic (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavafcki Zavod, 1982), 90-91 and 172-174.
125M Department of the Army, Pamrhlet No. 20-260, 33.
126Tito, 137 and 174.
/
12 7 1bid., 77, 92 and 103. 1281bid. 103. •,103. •
12 9Tito, 164-167; and HQ Department of the Army, Pamphlet No. 20-260,
34.
130Djilas, 113 and 149; and Tito, 92. 13 1Konrad Kellen, A View of the VC: Elements of Cohesion in the Enemy Camp in 1966-67 (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1969), 35 and 41-43. 1 32 Djilas, 3 and 57; Dedijer, Tito, 75; and Auty, 1396. 13 3Vladimir Dedijer, Tito (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1953), 50; Vladimir Dedijer, With Tito Through the War: Partisan Diary. 1941-1944 (London: Alexander Hamilton Publishers, 1951), 47; and Kellen, 50. 134Kellen, 44-46. 1 35 Ibid., 49-50. 13 6Tito, 75.
137Hehn, 11; and HQ Department of the Army, Pamphlet No. 20-260, 1.
13 8pike, War. Peace. and the Viet Conq, 4.
139Heniderson, 121. 14 0Leon Gore, Inducements and Deterrents To Defection: An Analysis of the Motives of 125 Defectors (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1968), ix-xii; and Leon Gore, A.J. Russo, and D. Scott, Some Findings of the Viet ConM Motivation and Morale Study: June-December 1965 (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1966), x-xii.
49
, – . – — – , / , . . , .. ,N , ” ” ” i’ i
14Tit, 106.
142Donnell, 32. 14 3Michael Lee Lanning, Inside the IRRPs (New York: Ivy Books, 1988),.
170.
1 4 4 HQ Department of the Army, Pamphlet No. 20-260, 48.
145Gore, Rsso, and Scott, 3-7.
146Ibid., 8-9.
147j. W. McCoy, Secrets of the Viet Cong (New York: Hippocrene Books
Inc., 1992), 134.
148Gore, Russo, arnd Scott, 9-10.
149Do las Pike, Viet Conc: The OrQanization and Technigues of the National Liberation Front of Vietnam (CmQridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1969), 236.
15OKellen, 24-25; and Pike, Viet Conl, 238.
151Kellen, 32. 152Ibid., 34. 1 5 3 HQ Departient of the Army, FM 90-8, 2-5.
15 4MUS diagram was derived from Pike, War. Peace and the Viet Conq,
2-4.
15 5 Ihis diagram was derived from Henderson, 35.
/
50
/
//
I
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Roberts, Walter. Tito. Mihailovic and the Allies, 1941-1945. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1973.
Sarkesian, Sam C., ed. Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare. Chicago: Precedent Publishing, Inc., 1975.
Tito, Josip Broz. Josip Broz Tito: Military Thouaht and Works: Selected Writings (1936-1979). Translated by Dufsan Isakovibc, Kordija Kveder and Milan Paramakovic. Belgrade: Vojnoizdavafcki Zavod, 1982.
Trgo, F., M. Lekovic, M. Bojic, and V. Kljakovic. Tito’s Historical Decisions. Belgrade: Naradna Armija, 1980.
Truong, Nhu T’ang. A Viet Concr Memoir. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1985.
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Vo, Nguyen Giap. “BiQ Victory Great Task”: North Vietnam’s Minister of Defense Assesses the Course of the War. New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1968.
_ The Military Art of the People’s War: Selected Writincgs of Vo Nguyen GiaW. Edited by Russell Stetler. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970.
• People’s War. People’s Army: the Viet Conc Insurrection Manual for Underdeveloped Countries. New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1962.
Vo, Nguyen, Giap and Van Tien Dung. How We Won the War. Philadelphia: RECON Publications, 1976.
von Clausewitz, Carl. On Translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
Ziemke, Earl F. “Clearing the Balkans.” In History of the Second World War, ed. Sir Basil Liddell Hart and Barrie Pitt, 2149-2156. London: BPC Publishing Ltd., 1966.
“Yugoslavia (1941-1944).” In History of Revolutionary Warfare. Vol. II, Evolution of the Comonents of Revolutionary Warfare, ed. Major H. M. Hannon and Major J. A. Cope Jr., 8-1 – 8-31. West Point: United States Military Academy, 1977.
Anderson, M., M. Arnsten, and H. Averch. Insurgent Organization and Operations: A Case Study of the Viet Cong in the Delta, 1964-66. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1967.
Carrier, J. M., and C. A. H. Thomson. Viet Conct Motivation and Morale: The Special Case of Chieu Hoi. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1966.
Davison, W. P. cM• observations on Viet Conci QOerations in the Villages. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1968.
Davison, W. P., and J. J. Zasloff. A Profile of Viet Conc Cadres. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1966.
Denton, Frank H. Some Effects of Military Operations on Viet Co=n Attitudes. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1966. -,
. Volunteers for the Viet Cong. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1968.
Donnell, John C. Viet Cogn Recruitment: Why and How Men Join. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1967.
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Donnell, John C., Guy J. Pauker, and Joeseph J. Zasloff. Viet Conc Motivation and Morale: a Preliminary Report (U). Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1965.
. Viet Cong Motivation and Morale in 1964: a Preliminaryeport. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1965.
Elliot, D. W. P., and M. Elliot. Documents of an Elite Viet Cong Unit: The Demolition Platoon of the 514th Battalion-Part One: Unit Caluoition and Personnel. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1969.
• Documents of an Elite Viet Conct Unit: The Demolition Platoon of the 514th Battalion-Part Two: Party Ornanization. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1969.
_ Documents of an Elite Viet Con= Unit: The Demolition Platoon of the 514th Battalion-Part Three: Military Orcranizations and Activities. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1969.
____ rxrnts of an Elite Viet Con= Unit: The Demolition Platoon of the 514th Battalion-Part Four: Political Indoctrination and Military Training. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1969.
_Documents of an Elite Viet Conq Unit: The Demolition Platoon of the 514th Battalion-Part Five: Personal Letter. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1969.
Elliot, D. W. P., and C. A. H. Thoason. A Look at the VC Cadres: Dinh Tn-. Province, 1965-1966. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1967.
Gore, Leon. Inducements and Deterrents to Defection: An Analysis of the Motives of 125 Defectors. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1968.
_ Some Impressions of the Effects of Military Operations on Viet Con,., Behavior. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1965.
Gore, Leon, and C. A. H. Thomson. Some Invressions of Viet Con ” Vulnerabilities: an Interim Rert. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1965. \
Gore, Leon, A. J. Russo, and D. Pcott. Sane Findings of the Viet Con,.j Motivation and Morale Study: June-December 1965. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1966.
Gurtov, M. The War in the Delta: Views fran Three Viet Conq Battalions. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 11967.
_ Viet Conct Cadres and th Cadre System: A Study of the Main and I Forces. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1967.
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Holliday, R. M., and R. M. Gurfield. Viet Con Logistics. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1968.
Kellen, Konrad. A View of the VC: Elements of Cohesion in the Enm Camp in 1966-67. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1969.
• Conversations With Enemy Soldiers in Late 1968/Early 1969: A Study of Motivation and Morale. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1970.
Mirke, Martin, and Edward R. Williams. A Technigue for Sinulatirn Unit Effectiveness, with Reference to Guerrilla Operations. Fort Belvoir: Combat Operations Research Group, Technical Operations Inc., 1962.
Leites, Nathan. The Viet Con= Style of Politics. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1969.
Molnar, Andrew R. Human Factors Considerations of Undjergronds in Insurrencie. Washington D.C.: Center for Research in Social Systems, the American University, 1966.
Pearce, Michael R. The Insurgent Environment. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1969.
Pohle, Victoria. The Viet Cong in Saigon: Tactics and Objectives During the Tet Offensive. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1969.
. Time and Limited Success as Enemies of the Vietcon1 , Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1967.
Zasloff, Joeseph J. Political Motivation of the Viet Coni: The Vietminh e Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1968.
Journal and Magazine Articles
Arbuckle, Tammy. “Yugoslavia: Strategy and Tactics of Ethnic Warfare.” International Defense Review 25 (January 1992): 19-22.
Magas, Branka. ‘”The War in Yugoslavia.” RUSL Journa 136 (Winter 1991): 33.
Rustin, Richard. “Tito and His Partisan Army: Yuoslavia, 1941-45.1″ s a 81 (July/August 1980): 4-12.
Sikorski, Radek. “Irreconcilable Differences.” National Review 43 (18 Ma 1991): 26-27.
Smolawe, Jill. “Why Do They Keep on Killing?” Time, 11 May 1992, 48-49.
Spiller, Roger J. “Isen’s Run: Human Dimensions of Warfare in the 20th Century.” Military Review (May 1988): 16-31.
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_ “S.L.A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire.” RUSI Journal 133 (Winter
1988): 63-71.
” . “Shell Shock.” American HeritaQe (May-June 1990): 74-86.
Unpublished Dissertations, Theses and Papers
Glenn, Russell W. ‘Men Against Fire in Vietnam.” School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, U.S. Army Coanrnd and General Staff College, 1987.
House, John M. “The Moral Domain of Low Intensity Conflict.” School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, U.S. Army Conmrand and General Staff College, 1988. Interview
Schneider, James J. Interview by Cpt. Daniel L. Zajac, 12 August 1992, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Caumand and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Ks.
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