EGME‐401‐1

EGME‐401‐1
Fall 2105   Case Study 1 – Ford Pinto 1
(1) “Engineering Ethics – Concepts and Cases”, Harris et. al, Cengage, 5th ed.
In the late 1960s, Ford designed a subcompact, the Pinto, weighed less than 2,000 pounds and sold for less than $
2,000. Anxious to compete with foreign‐made subcompacts, Ford brought the car into production in slightly more than
2 years (compared with the usual 3 ½ years). Given this shorter time frame, styling preceded much of the engineering,
thus restricting engineering design more than usual. As a result, it was decided that the best place for the gas tank was
between the rear axle and the bumper. The differential housing had exposed bolt heads that could puncture the gas
tank if the tank were driven forward against them upon rear impact.  In court, the crash tests were described asfollows:
These prototypes as well as two production Pintos were crash tested by Ford to determine, among other things, the
integrity of the fuel system in rear‐ end accidents…. Prototypes struck from the rear with a moving barrier at 21‐ miles‐
per‐ hour caused the fuel tank to be driven forward and to be punctured, causing fuel leakage.… A production Pinto
crash tested at 21‐ miles‐ per‐ hour into a fixed barrier caused the fuel tank to be torn from the gas tank and the tank
to be punctured by a bolt head on the differential housing. In at least one test, spilled fuel entered the driver’s
compartment. Ford also tested rear impact when rubber bladders were installed in the tank, as well as when the tank
was located above rather than behind the rear axle. Both passed the 20‐ mile‐ per‐ hour rear impact tests. Although
the federal government was pressing to stiffen regulations on gas tank designs, Ford contented that the Pinto met all
applicable federal safety standards at the time. J. C. Echold, director of automotive safety for Ford, issued a study titled
“Fatalities Associated with Crash Induced Fuel Leakage and Fires.” This study claimed that the costs of improving the
design ($ 11 per vehicle) outweighed its social benefits. A memorandum attached to the report described the costs
and benefits as follows:
Benefits
Savings 180 burn deaths, 180 serious burn injuries, 2,100 burned vehicles
Unit cost $ 200,000 per death, $ 67,000 per injury, $ 700 per vehicle
Total benefits 180 x $ 200,000 + 180 $ x 67,000 + 2100 x  $ 700 = $ 49.15 million
Costs
Sales 11 million cars, 1.5 million light trucks
Unit cost $ 11 per car, $ 11 per truck
Total costs 11,000,000 x $ 11 + 1,500,000 x $ 11 = $ 137 million
The estimate of the number of deaths, injuries, and damage to vehicles was based on statistical studies. The $ 200,000
for the loss of a human life was based on an NHTSA study, which estimated social costs of a death as follows:
Cost Component 1971 Costs
Future productivity losses Direct $ 132,000 + Indirect $ 41,300
Medical costs Hospital $700 + Other $425
Property damage + Insurance administration $1,500 + $4,700
Legal and court $3000
Employer losses $1,000
Victim’s pain and suffering $10,000
Funeral $900
Assets ( lost consumption) + Misc. 5000 + 200
Total per fatality $ 200,725
Report Assignment:
Discuss the appropriateness of using data such as these in Ford’s decision regarding whether or not to make a safety
improvement in its engineering design. If you believe thisis not appropriate, what would you suggest as an alternative?
What responsibilities do you think engineers have in situations like this?

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