Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies

2015, Vol. 22(4) 443–453
© The Authors 2015
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DOI: 10.1177/1548051815603127
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Regular Issue Article
Social judgment and justice are fundamental human preoccupations
(Weiner, 1995) that are prevalent in organizational
discourse. These judgments are important and
inescapable because they influence how workplace rewards
(e.g., compensation, promotion, praise, acceptance) and
punishments (e.g., demotion, termination, criticism, rejection)
are distributed. The mutual exchange of behavioral
expectations with supervisors and work peers form the basis
for employee accountability and accentuates the social context
in which employees judge deservingness and equity for
themselves and others (Frink et al., 2008). Little is known,
however, about employees’ comparative judgments, especially
when it comes to those of responsibility and accountability
(Bergsteiner & Avery, 2003).
Employees’ evaluations of their own and others’ failures
are important because these evaluations affect perceptions
of justice and deservingness in part from the types of attributions
(Martinko, Harvey, & Douglas, 2007) and dispositions
(Ross & Nisbett, 1991) made for the event. In this
study, we evaluated whether or not employees judge responsibility
and accountability for themselves the same as they
do for others. For example, if an employee made a workplace
mistake, would this employee judge himself differently
than if he was to judge a coworker for making this
same mistake? The major implication is that employees
regularly evaluate themselves and others and make important
decisions based on these judgments, yet researchers do
not know if these judgments are made similarly. Prior
research evidence reveals that people believe they are more
ethical than others (Dunning, 2005), rely on their intentions
more when evaluating themselves versus others (Kruger &
Gilovich, 2004), make more moral-based evaluations when
judging others (Bazinska & Wojciszke, 1996), yet ironically
make more accurate predictions for other peoples’ behavior
(Dunning, 2005). Based on these differences in self versus
social perceptions, we evaluated whether or not these perspectives
also exist when employees make self versus social
judgments of responsibility and accountability.
Prior empirical accountability studies primarily concentrate
on how employees perceive and react to accountability
(Frink & Klimoski, 1998) but do not consider if there are
differences in how employees assign responsibility and
accountability for themselves versus others. This gap is a
problem because researchers (e.g., Bergsteiner & Avery,
2003; Frink & Klimoski, 1998) contend that accountability
and responsibility become defined over time through iterative
cycles that develop as a result of employee interactions
with others (i.e., supervisors and work peers). To understand
these iterative cycles, researchers must be able to
measure and predict how employees judge responsibility
and accountability for both themselves and others.
Additionally, accountability researchers (Bergsteiner &
Avery, 2003; Cummings & Anton, 1990; Schlenker, Britt,
603127JLOXXX10.1177/1548051815603127Journal of Leadership & Organizational StudiesBrees and Martinko
research-article2015
1
University of Scranton, Scranton, PA, USA
2
Florida A&M University, Tallahassee, FL, USA
Corresponding Author:
Jeremy Brees, University of Scranton, 320 Madison Avenue, Scranton,
PA 18510, USA.
Email: jeremybrees@gmail.com
Judgments of Responsibility Versus
Accountability
Jeremy Brees1
and Mark J. Martinko2
Abstract
We proposed and found that employees’ judgments of responsibility and accountability are distinct but positively related
constructs. Using attribution theory for responsibility judgments and lay dispositionalism for accountability judgments,
we hypothesized that employees hold others more responsible (i.e., causal) and accountable (i.e., punishable) than they
hold themselves for the same workplace mistakes. Independent mean differences within a sample of 286 working adults
revealed that people held others more responsible but not more accountable than they held themselves. Post hoc analyses
revealed a counterintuitive finding. Counter to what theory would predict, as workplace mistake seriousness increased
the variation between self-judgement and other-judgment decreased. Implications and future directions for accountability
research are discussed.
Keywords
cognitive processes, decision making, motivation
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444 Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies 22(4)
Pennington, Murphy, & Doherty, 1994; Schlenker &
Weigold, 1989) have long debated the distinctions between
responsibility and accountability but have never tested it.
Empirically assessing this relationship will move accountability
theory forward.
We advance accountability theory in three ways. First,
we briefly review and summarize how responsibility and
accountability are conceptually different so that future
research can proceed with clarity. Second, we hypothesize
and empirically test the relationship between judgments of
responsibility and accountability so that researchers can
proceed knowing the strength and direction of this association.
Third, we draw on attribution theory (Weiner, 1985)
for responsibility and lay dispositionism (Ross & Nisbett,
1991) for accountability to test whether or not employees
judge others more responsible and accountable than they
judge themselves for the same workplace failures.
Measuring and understanding these judgments will illuminate
the iterative cycles found within prominent accountability
frameworks.
Responsibility Versus Accountability
Important conceptual distinctions exist between responsibility
and accountability, yet in everyday language, people
often use these terms synonymously. We discuss these differences
and demonstrate how they influence the social
judgment process in organizations. Being held responsible
for a behavior or outcome is different from being held
accountable for it.
Judgments of responsibility are assessments of whom or
what caused an event or outcome. Attribution (Kelley,
1973; Weiner, 1985, 1995) and accountability researchers
(Bergsteiner & Avery, 2003, Cummings & Anton, 1990;
Schlenker et al., 1994) agree that assessing personal causality
is the first step toward holding someone accountable.
The basic human urge to ascribe causality for events is
instinctual (White, 1959) and results from a desire to anticipate
and predict future events and choose productive
response strategies (Heider, 1958). Weiner (1995) argues
that responsibility inferences require causal beliefs of
human involvement, or personal causality. Psychological
models reveal that internal causality attributions more likely
lead to personal responsibility assignments (Kelley, 1967;
Snyder, 1985; Weiner, 1985), whereas external attributions
do not. In organizations, personal causality ascriptions for
outcomes are important because they inform when and how
people are evaluated and how rewards and punishments are
distributed (Martinko et al., 2007). Therefore, judgments of
responsibility are causality ascriptions (Bergsteiner &
Avery, 2003), which likely lead to punishment ascriptions
(Weiner, 1995).
Judgments of accountability refer to how punishable someone
should be held for a behavior or outcome (Bergsteiner &
Avery, 2003). Attribution and accountability researchers
also agree on how social perception influences accountability
ascriptions. Specifically, attribution theorists argue that
people are held accountable for violating social norms or
transgressions that break social expectations (Weiner,
1995). Accountability researchers agree that people are held
accountable for the lack of fulfillment of social obligations,
duties, and expectations (Schlenker & Weigold, 1989).
These perspectives are like the ought concept proposed by
Heider (1958), who asserted that oughts have the psychological
property of requiredness as they match actions and
events to the relevant standards for acceptable behaviors. If
there is a discrepancy between actors’ behavior and observers’
ought beliefs, a psychological state of tension is
incurred, which leads to the evaluation and judgment of
others. Cummings and Anton (1990) concurred when they
argued that accountability includes bearing the consequences
for a deviation in behavior.
To further clarify and delineate responsibility versus
accountability, consider the following legal metaphor: a
judgment of responsibility is the verdict of either guilty or
innocent, whereas a judgment of accountability is the sentencing
of punishment. Weiner (1995, p. 4) stated that “life
is a courtroom where interpersonal dramas are played out
and where we judge one another, gather information to
determine causality and responsibility, allow for selfdefense,
pass sentences, consider parole, and so on.” While
judgments of responsibility and accountability are likely
interrelated (Schlenker et al., 1994; Weiner, 1995) in the
context of judgments at work, there are frequent instances
where one does not necessarily lead to the other. For example,
John may be responsible for not complying with customers’
demands but may not be held accountable because
the store was unusually busy at the time. There are also situations
where people are held accountable when they are not
responsible. For example, John may be held accountable for
losing a customer account when the actual cause was his
supervisor’s negligence. Our goal is to highlight differences
between accountability and responsibility and predict and
test the relationships between them. Thus, we test whether
observers’ judgments of responsibility and accountability
are empirically different, which is a distinction that both
attribution and accountability researchers have repeatedly
made but not yet tested (e.g., Cummings & Anton, 1990;
Schlenker et al., 1994; Weiner, 1995, 2004). Therefore, we
hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1: Judgments of responsibility and accountability
are distinct constructs.
Despite being theoretically distinct constructs, we believe
that responsibility judgments are positively correlated with
accountability judgments. Schlenker et al. (1994) proposed
that the strength or weakness of assigned responsibility acts
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Brees and Martinko 445
as a psychological highway that produces an equally strong
evaluation of the culpability of the individual associated
with the evaluation. Schlenker et al. also argued that the
strength of three elements influence how accountable a person
should be held. These elements are prescriptions for
behavior (codes or rules for conduct), the event itself (a specific
unit of action/outcome), and the identity images of the
actor (actor’s role, qualities, commitments).
Similarly, Heider (1958) posited that psychologically
connected elements (actions/outcomes and the individual
that caused them) tend to be evaluated similarly.
Responsibility transfers information from an event to an
actor, so that the actor is then categorized and evaluated.
Therefore, judgments of how accountable someone should
be held for an action or outcome is likely dependent on
judgments of how responsible they are for that action or
outcome. Being held accountable focuses on the liability for
appropriate sanctions (Schlenker et al., 1994), and as such,
the fear of accountability is often the mechanism through
which organizations control the behavior of their employees
(Frink et al., 2008). We contend that being held responsible
is likely a precondition to being held accountable.
Therefore,
Hypothesis 2: Judgments of responsibility and accountability
are positively associated.
We just reviewed the relevant literature and proposed
how judgments of responsibility and accountability are distinct
and how they are associated. Next, we will further
develop the concepts of responsibility and accountability
and discuss the theoretical rational for how people assign
them. More specifically, we will explain why people likely
hold others more responsible (i.e., causally) and accountable
(i.e., liable) than themselves for the same behavior.
Judgments of Responsibility
When examining the anatomy of responsibility, Weiner
(1995) argued that under specific conditions people are held
responsible with what is called an attribution of responsibility.
Assignments of responsibility lead to blame, which then
generates retaliation and punishment. This human motivational
sequence begins with an observed outcome then to a
causal determination and the assignment of responsibility,
to blame, and finally, to punishment. In this section, we discuss
the initial step in this motivational process (i.e., from
observed outcome to causal determination) and use attribution
theory (Weiner, 1985, 1995) to compare how actors and
observers make such judgments of responsibility.
We agree with attribution theorists that judgments of
responsibility are subjective evaluations of causality.
Attribution theory (Weiner, 1985, 1995, 2004) states that
humans naturally seek to understand the causes of events
and make causal ascriptions (i.e., attributions) for important,
surprising, and/or negative events. Workplace failures
constitute such events. Attributions are relevant within
organizations because the way in which people attribute
causality influences their interpretations of events, interpersonal
interactions, and predict behavioral responses
(Martinko et al., 2007). People make attributions from two
distinct viewpoints: actors and observers. Actors make attributions
for their own behavior/outcomes (i.e., selfattributions),
whereas observers make attributions for
actors’ behavior/outcomes (i.e., social attributions). Each
distinct process informs how both actors and observers
ascribe responsibility judgments for their own and others
behavior/outcomes.
Attribution researchers argue that people exhibit stable
attributional biases (Martinko, Douglas, & Harvey, 2006b)
that distort their causal perceptions and lead to assignments
of responsibility for themselves and others. These include
the actor-observer, self-serving, and false consensus biases.
We believe that each of these attributional biases—especially
the three of them acting together—influence judgments
of responsibility for both actors and observers. In
addition to personal biases, social context also influences
how attributions are made (Martinko, Douglas, & Harvey,
2006a). Thus, hierarchical position, power relationships,
and personal liking may also affect attributions and social
judgments but were not included as variables in this study.
The actor-observer bias refers to actors’ tendencies to
attribute their own behavior to external factors (e.g., the situation
or other people) and observers to attribute actors’
behaviors to internal factors (e.g., the actors’ ability or personality).
This bias is also known as the fundamental attribution
error and is simple to explain. Since actors’ attention and
focus are directed outwardly on situational factors (i.e., external),
they disproportionately attribute external factors as the
causes of their own behavior or outcomes. Alternatively,
since observers concentrate their focus and attention on the
actor, the observer will likely conclude that the actor’s behavior
originated from internal traits (e.g., ability or personality).
Therefore, the actor-observer bias leads actors to attribute
external factors for their own failures, while observers believe
actors are the cause of their own failure.
The self-serving bias is the tendency for actors to take
credit for successes and blame external factors for failures.
This bias primarily influences self-attributions and is also
simple to explain. People strive to associate themselves with
successes and distance themselves from failures due to the
resulting impact on self-esteem, worth, and ego (Mezulis,
Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004). Therefore, if an outcome
is positive or a success, actors will likely attribute it to themselves
(i.e., internal). Conversely, if an outcome is negative or
a failure, actors will likely attribute that outcome to situational
factors or other people (i.e., external). The self-serving
bias causes actors to disproportionately believe that
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446 Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies 22(4)
their successes come from within (i.e., they are responsible),
while their failures result from other things (i.e., situational
factors or others people are responsible).
The false consensus bias operates when observers make
social attributions, and it occurs because observers believe
that their own behavior and choices are appropriate and
typical and then uses them as standards to judge the behavior/outcomes
of others (Martinko, 2002). Observers exhibiting
this bias disproportionately believe that actors’ failures
are due to dispositional factors (Martinko & Gardner, 1987).
Alternatively, when observers witness an actor’s success,
they tend to believe that this success was expected and thus
due to situational factors. An actor’s failure or success
likely influences the manner in which observers assign
responsibility for that event.
These three common attributional biases, both on their
own and operating together, suggest that actors will disproportionately
attribute their own failures to external factors
and successes to internal factors. Alternatively, observers
will attribute actors’ failures to internal factors and successes
to external factors. We argue that these attributional
biases influence both actors’ and observers’ judgments of
responsibility and will result in actors holding themselves
less responsible for workplace failures than they hold others.
Therefore,
Hypothesis 3: Employees will hold themselves less
responsible than they hold others for the same workplace
failures.
An Accountability Paradox
Before examining judgments of accountability, we briefly
highlight an inconsistency within accountability research
and discuss how judgments of accountability overcome it.
Researchers (Cummings & Anton, 1990; Schlenker et al.,
1994; Schlenker & Weigold, 1989) have claimed that
accountability is a complex, multilevel, and multifaceted
phenomenon that must be examined from multiple perspectives
(Frink & Klimoski, 1998). Accountability is a highly
interpersonal process (Frink et al., 2008) and social mechanism
(Dubnick, 2003) that results from an iterative cycle of
give and take between actors and observers (Cummings &
Anton, 1990). Frink and Klimoski’s (1998) role theory
model also proposed that accountability enactment is an
ever-changing and iterative cycle influenced by both actors
and observers. Bergsteiner and Avery’s (2003) integrative
responsibility and accountability model revealed that
accountability episodes unfold as actors’ and observers’
roles, actions, and decisions influence this process. Despite
observers’ perceptions and judgments being important
within accountability enactment, researchers have only
defined and measured it from the actors’ perspective being
held accountable.
Psychology researchers define accountability as “the
implicit or explicit expectation that one may be called on to
justify one’s beliefs, feelings, and actions to others” (Lerner
& Tetlock, 1999, p. 255). Management researchers similarly
define it as “an assessment of the potential for a pending
evaluation and liability to answer for decisions,
behaviors, actions, or outcomes by some focal entity to
another entity or entities having some interest, reason, or
capacity for reward or sanction” (Frink et al., 2008, p. 182).
Although both perspectives are valid ways of defining and
measuring accountability, researchers continue to ignore
the interaction of how actors and observers assess actor
behavior prior to and after actors are called to account.
Therefore, research that excludes observers’ perceptions
of responsibility and accountability remain incomplete.
Bergsteiner and Avery (2003, 2010) proposed that
observers determine an appropriate accountability
response (i.e., a judgment as to whether and how to reward,
counsel, sanction, punish, or otherwise deal with an outcome)
and judged accountability (i.e., how people are
dealt with as a result of their actions). Our judgments of
accountability concept combine these two processes into a
more parsimonious process step. Judgments of accountability
allow for both self- and other-based assessments of
whether or not, and how much, an actor should be punished
for a failure and also overcomes the limited perspective
within current accountability models and measurement
tools.
Judgments of Accountability
We assert that judgments of accountability are subjective
evaluations of how punishable an actor should be held for a
given behavior and/or outcome. We hypothesized that
judgments of responsibility are positively associated with
judgments of accountability, because as personal causality
for an outcome increases so too does the likelihood that
individuals should be disciplined accordingly (Schlenker
et al., 1994). Judgments of accountability are common in
organizations, and research evidence suggests that where
someone stands (i.e., actor or observer) influences the
degree of cognitive elaboration undertaken when making
them (Dunning, 2005; Jones & Davis, 1965) and affects the
degree of punishment that is deemed appropriate.
From a motivational perspective, actors have a strong
incentive to assess and manage others’ impressions of
accountability in order to reduce the likelihood of punishment
(Weiner, 1995, 2004). Research evidence reveals that
when under scrutiny actors engage in more detailed cognitive
information processing (Schlenker & Weigold, 1989; Tetlock,
1985), become more aware of identity prescriptions that govern
their behavior (Schlenker, 1985), and become more
thoughtful in how they can explain their behavior/outcomes
(Schlenker, 1987; Tetlock, 1985). These findings indicate
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Brees and Martinko 447
that actors expend more time and cognitive energy than
observers in assessing their own failures and outcomes.
Employees’ response strategies suggest that they think
differently when faced with accountability. Researchers
found that when people face accountability they often avoid
culpability by engaging in self-protective behaviors (Frink
et al., 2008; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Schlenker et al., 1994;
Schlenker & Weigold, 1989). Moral behavior and selfinsight
research reveals that actors believe their moral character
is superior to others (Dunning, 2005), rely on their
intentions rather than outcomes when evaluating themselves
(Kruger & Gilovich, 2004), and disproportionately
focus on favorable rather than negative information to
explain their failures (Dunning, 2005). These thinking patterns
and reactions suggest that actors perceive and evaluate
their situation fundamentally differently than observers.
Therefore, failures that may lead to sanctions heighten
actors cognitive processing and defensive posturing behaviors
and thus increase the likelihood that actors rely on situational
or external factors to explain their failure (Martinko
et al., 2007). Based on these research findings, actors will
believe that they are not at fault and thus should be granted
a lesser accountability sentence. Anecdotally, this may be
why organizational actors tend to avoid accountability for
their behavior and/or outcomes.
Alternatively, although organizational observers (e.g.,
supervisors, coworkers, human resources) have sufficient
reason to scrutinize actors’ outcomes, research evidence
suggests that observers often rely on cognitive heuristics or
implicit theories when evaluating others. These cognitive
shortcuts fall under the concept of “lay dispositionalism”
(Ross & Nisbett, 1991), which states that observers infer
actors’ dispositions from their behavior, use oversimplified
reasoning (Nisbett & Ross, 1980), and make overly confident
predictions of others when only sampling a few discrete
behaviors (Dunning, Griffin, Milojkovic, & Ross,
1990). Research reveals that observers generally disregard
the role and strength of situational or external factors in
influencing actors’ behavior and thus mistakenly conclude
that actors’ behaviors are signals of their underlying character
traits. Jones and Davis (1965) argued that observers only
seek to find sufficient reason why an actor behaved a certain
way and observers’ explanations halt when an actor’s intention
or motive is assigned that is reason enough.
Although organizational observers should consider situational
circumstances when executing sanctions, research
reveals that observers tend to make abbreviated and spontaneous
judgments of actors based on faulty assumptions of
human behavior (Dunning, 2005). Observers’ degree of
cognitive elaboration undertaken when evaluating actors’
outcomes will likely influence how punishable (i.e.,
accountable) observers believe that actors should be held.
Observers’ oversimplified reasoning process can be problematic
when their judgments of accountability result in
impactful sanctions such as tarnishing an actor’s reputation,
which can strongly influence future employment decisions
(e.g., promotions, raises, work assignments) and even result
in termination.
There are considerable cognitive processing and decision-making
style differences between actors and observers.
Research indicates that actors are highly motivated to
diagnose and justify their behavior and outcomes, often
relying on situational explanations for their behavior.
Alternatively, observers disproportionately rely on more
general and abbreviated decision-making heuristics when
making social observations and discount situational factors
when making assessments of actors. Therefore, we posit the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: Individuals will hold others more accountable
than they hold themselves for the same workplace
failures.
From a practitioner standpoint, research paints a troubling
picture. Although organizational observers should be
motivated to conduct a thorough analysis of actors’ behavior
and outcomes, research evidence reveals that observers
rarely take the time and effort to do so. Organizational
actors should accept responsibility and accountability for
their outcomes (Brees, Mackey, Martinko, & Harvey,
2014) yet disproportionately do so. This inconsistency and
error between actor and observer cognitive processing and
responses when judging workplace mistakes creates a
dilemma that should be studied in more depth as organizational
rewards and punishments are distributed as a result
of it.
Method
Sample
We used a convenience sampling technique to obtain a sample
of 286 working adults who completed an online survey
(58% response rate). We chose this technique to increase
the chances of obtaining subjects from a variety of industries,
businesses, jobs, and locations, thus increasing the
generalizability of our results. The average subject age was
44.5 years (SD = 12), company tenure averaged 10.2 years
(SD = 9.3), worked on average 45 hours/week (SD = 11.9),
and 54% of the sample was female.
Procedure
Undergraduate business students were given extra course
credit for providing e-mails for working adults that they
knew working at least part-time (i.e., at least 20 hours/
week) and who were willing to participate in the study. The
principal researcher e-mailed subjects directly asking them
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448 Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies 22(4)
to complete an anonymous online questionnaire. Subjects
were told they were responding to a questionnaire assessing
their workplace attitudes and opinions.
Our study used a between-groups independent-samples t
test design. To assess whether there were differences
between subjects’ judgments of responsibility and accountability
for themselves versus others, the online survey
instrument randomly split the subjects into two groups. This
random assignment of subjects to the self versus other conditions
introduced an experimental design element to this
study. The first group of subjects (n = 149) responded to
two workplace scenarios about themselves (i.e., selfevaluations).
The second group of subjects (n = 137)
responded to the same two workplace scenarios about a
coworker (i.e., other-evaluations).
The survey began with a brief introduction telling subjects
that they will read two workplace scenarios and were
asked to either imagine themselves in the situations (for
self-evaluations) or imagine a coworker in the situations
(for other-evaluations). Every subject read the same two
hypothetical workplace scenarios designed to communicate
a minor workplace mistake and a major workplace mistake.
The minor workplace mistake scenario communicated that
the subject (or a coworker) forgot to invite several coworkers
to an important project meeting. The major workplace
mistake scenario communicated that the subject (or a
coworker) missed several important project steps and thus
caused his or her company to lose the entire project and not
be reimbursed for expenses the company already incurred.
Wording variations in the scenarios appropriately reflected
the two groups (i.e., self vs. others). To ensure that subjects
perceived the two scenarios as escalating in seriousness, we
included a manipulation check after each scenario, whereby
subjects provided their ratings of how serious they perceived
the workplace mistake.
Measures
Judgments of Responsibility. Subjects’ judgments of responsibility
(self-responsibility a = .80; other-responsibility a = .87)
were measured using two 3-item scales to assess how causally
associated the subjects felt they (for self-evaluations) or
another person (for other-evaluations) were for the workplace
mistakes provided in two scenarios. Sample items
include “It is your fault the people were not updated on the
project” (minor workplace mistake) and “You are responsible
for the company losing this contract” (major workplace
mistake). Responses were recorded on a 7-point scale
(1 = Completely disagree, 7 = Completely agree).
Judgments of Accountability. Subjects’ judgments of accountability
(self-accountability a = .81; other-accountability a =
.77) were measured using two 3-item scales to assess how
accountable (i.e., punishable) the subjects felt they (for selfevaluations)
or another person (for other-evaluations) were
for the workplace mistakes provided in two scenarios. This
measure was adapted from prior disciplinary judgment
measures (Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002; Fukami &
Hopkins, 1993). Sample items include “How severely
should you be punished for losing this contract?” and “What
action should your supervisor take in response to the contract
being lost?” Responses were recorded on several
7-point scales (e.g., 1 = Not at all, 7 = Extremely; and 1 =
Excuse your behavior, 7 = Fire you).
Control Variables. We controlled age, gender, and organizational
tenure. These factors were controlled to reduce the
likelihood that they affected subjects’ judgments of responsibility
and accountability (Martinko et al., 2006a) and
potential gender effects (Martinko et al., 2007).
Results
Hypothesis Results
Hypothesis 1. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics, intercorrelations,
and internal consistency/reliability coefficients
for the study variables. To evaluate Hypothesis 1, we used
a confirmatory factor analysis to evaluate whether judgments
of responsibility were different than judgments of
accountability. We specified the two latent factors (responsibility
and accountability) and loaded the items on their
respective factor to assess fit. We ran the two-factor model
then deleted one latent factor and loaded all 12 items on one
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Among the Focal Variables.
Variable
Overall Self-assessment Other-assessment
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5
1. Age 44.5 12 45.6 11.9 43.3 12.06 —
2. Gender 1.54 0.49 1.53 0.5 1.55 0.5 -.01 —
3. Organizational tenure 10.2 9.3 10.50 9.40 9.85 9.03 .49** -.09 —
4. Judgments of accountability 4.83 0.96 4.74 1.06 4.92 0.82 .02 .05 .01 —
5. Judgments of responsibility 5.58 1.2 5.43 1.28 5.74 1.08 -.04 .10* .00 .77** —
Note. N = 286,*p < .05, **p < .01 (two-tailed tests): internal reliability coefficients (alphas) are reported in the measures section.
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Brees and Martinko 449
factor to assess whether the fit statistics got better or worse.
The two-factor model (Tucker-Lewis index = .522, normed
fit index = .607, comparative fit index = .616) fit better than
the one-factor model (Tucker-Lewis index = .491, normed
fit index = .575, comparative fit index = .584); thus, Hypothesis
1 was supported.
Hypothesis 2. We used a bivariate correlation to test Hypothesis
2, which predicted that subjects’ judgments of responsibility
would be positively associated with their judgments
of accountability, for both self- and other-assessments. Our
analysis results indicated a positive and significant relationship
(r = .77; p < .001), which represents a large effect size
r = .59. Thus, our data reveal that when stronger judgments
of responsibility result for an outcome, judgments of
accountability will also likely result.
Hypotheses 3 and 4. We conducted an independent-samples
t test to assess Hypotheses 3 and 4, which stated that employees
would hold themselves less responsible (Hypothesis 3)
and less accountable (Hypothesis 4) than they hold others
for the same workplace behavior or outcome. Our analyses
revealed that subjects did hold themselves less responsible
(M = 5.57, SD = 1.35) than they did others (M = 5.86, SD =
1.15), and this difference was significant, t(284) = -1.97,
p < .05. Thus, Hypothesis 3 was supported, and our results
represent a small effect size, r = .12. Our analyses indicated
that subjects did hold themselves less accountable (M =
4.74, SD = 1.06) than they did others (M = 4.92, SD = .82),
but this difference was not significant, t(284) = -1.58, ns.
Although Hypothesis 4 was not supported, it was in the predicted
direction and represented a small effect size, r = .09.
Post Hoc Analysis
To better understand the nuances of our study’s relationships,
we conducted a post hoc analysis that yielded some
interesting and counterintuitive findings related to how
people assign judgments of responsibility and accountability.
Although we did not formally hypothesize judgment
differences across scenario mistake severity, we discovered
that mistake severity influenced subjects’ assessments of
responsibility and accountability.
To ensure that subjects perceived a difference in mistake
severity between the minor and major scenarios, we
included a manipulation check. Subjects rated the mistake
severity on a 9-point scale (1 = Not serious at all, 9 = Very
serious). Paired sample t tests appropriately revealed a significant
difference for mistake severity for both selfassessments
(minor mistake M = 5.84, SD = 2.41; major
mistake M = 8.46, SD = 1.15), t(67) = -8.59, p < .001, and
other-assessments (minor mistake M = 6.62, SD = 2.08;
major mistake M = 8.29, SD = 1.05), t(64) = -6.01, p < .001.
Worth noting is that the subjects evaluating themselves
(M = 5.84, SD = 2.41) rated the minor workplace error as
much less serious, t(131) = -1.99, p < .05, than the subjects
who rated others’ minor mistakes (M = 6.62, SD = 2.08).
There was no significant difference between the evaluated
seriousness of the major workplace mistake, t(131) = .93,
ns, between the self (M = 8.47, SD = 1.15) and others
(M = 8.29, SD = 1.05).
We conducted a 2 × 2 mixed analysis of variance with
between-subjects factor of group (self vs. other) and withinsubjects
factor of mistake severity (minor vs. major). Our
responsibility judgment results indicated that people held
themselves and others much less responsible for minor mistakes
(M = 5.12, SD = 1.8) than major mistakes (M = 6, SD
= 1.2), F(1, 284) = 68.10, p < .001, ?p
2
= .193. We found a
significant main effect for group (self- vs. other-judgments),
F(1, 284) = 4.99, p < .026, ?p
2
= .017. We also found a significant
group judgment × mistake severity interaction, F(1,
284) = 6.56, p < .011, ?p
2
= .023.
We conducted a second 2 × 2 mixed analysis of variance
with accountability as the dependent variable. Our accountability
judgment results indicated that people held themselves
and others much less accountable for minor mistakes
(M = 3.9, SD = 1.19) than major mistakes (M = 5.7, SD =
1.2), F(1, 284) = 427.6, p < .001, ?p
2
= .6. We did not find a
significant main effect for group, F(1, 284) = 2.52, p = .113,
nor a significant group judgment × mistake severity interaction,
F(1, 284) = 3.65, p = .057, ?p
2
= .013, although this
interaction did approach significance.
Discussion
Our results indicate that employees’ judgments of workplace
responsibility and accountability were distinct and
positively associated constructs. Employees’ assessments
of responsibility (i.e., causality) for workplace failures, for
both actors and observers, were significantly related to their
judgments of accountability (i.e., punishability). This finding
is important for two reasons. First, while both attribution
and accountability researchers have long argued that
responsibility and accountability are distinct and related
constructs, we now have an initial understanding of the
strength and direction of this relationship. We also found
that outcome severity is an important condition of this relationship.
Second, our results provide a foundation for future
research to springboard from in order to further develop and
understand how these social judgments occur. We found
that there were significant differences in how actors versus
observers assign responsibility and accountability for personal
versus social behavior/outcomes. This result was not
surprising considering decades of attribution theory and
research (Martinko et al., 2007), suggesting that actors (i.e.,
self-attributions) and observers (i.e., social attributions)
vary in their assessments of causality. Our post hoc analyses
regarding the strength of responsibility and accountability
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450 Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies 22(4)
attributions made across mistake scenarios reinforced this
finding.
Unfortunately, subjects’ accountability judgments did
not indicate a significant difference in how actors versus
observers assign punishment for workplace mistakes,
although this statistical finding approached significance.
Several factors may account for this. Respondents may not
have perceived the minor mistake as serious for themselves
but did for others as evidenced by the manipulation check
results. Thus, respondents’ bias in perceptions of minor
mistakes may have carried through to their accountability
and responsibility judgments. This may have occurred
because subjects perceived their own minor mistakes as significantly
less serious compared to others’ minor mistakes.
Perhaps the nature and/or content of the workplace mistake
scenarios in the questionnaire did not provide sufficient
information or meaningfulness to elicit stronger
accountability judgments. We did not evaluate, nor attempt
to control, which hypothetical coworker the subjects evaluated
in the other-based scenarios. Future researchers should
manipulate common coworker types, such as a close friend,
a disliked coworker, or a coworker they have not yet seen,
met, or know anything about to evaluate whether these factors
are consequential or not. Attribution theory predicts
that the more the subjects’ know, and like, the referent other
that they imagine in the scenario, the less likely the subjects
will evaluate them harshly. Alternatively, the less the subjects
know and/or like the referent other, the more likely
they will evaluate them harshly (Martinko et al., 2007).
Another consideration is that attributional processes are
only cued by relatively important, negative, or surprising
outcomes (Weiner, 1985). Thus, the serious mistake scenarios
may have cued more active attributional and/or
objective analyses, whereas the minor mistake scenarios
may have led the subjects to rely on scripts and/or cognitive
heuristics. As a result, the severe accountability judgments
may have been more objective and less biased than the less
severe scenarios because they generated explicit causal reasoning
in the form of attributions.
Our post hoc analyses results were both surprising and
counterintuitive. Counter to what theory would have predicted,
our data indicate that as workplace mistake severity
increases, actors’ and observers’ judgments of responsibility
and accountability become more aligned (i.e., less differentiated).
These results may indicate that a nonlinear
relationship exists between mistake severity and observers’
responsibility and accountability ascriptions. We predict
that as mistake severity increases, subjects will begin to
evaluate others more harshly than they do themselves. New
scenarios may need to be written and tested in order to simulate
a higher degree of coworker mistake to achieve this
result.
Although our depiction of responsibility assignment is
simple and straightforward, Weiner (1995) provided a more
detailed and nuanced description of the cognitive processes
observers use to assign responsibility (i.e., attributions of
causality) and thus arrive at assigned punishments (i.e.,
judgment of accountability). Future studies should move
beyond attribution biases and view specific attribution
styles (e.g., pessimistic/optimistic) to see how personalized
tendencies influence their judgments of responsibility and
accountability.
Decades of attribution research indicate that a multitude
of factors influence how observers make attributions, thus
how they make responsibility judgments. For example, a
supervisor or organizational bystander who has personal
experience within a given job will more likely attribute
actors’ behavior/outcomes to external factors versus internal
ones (Mitchell & Kalb, 1982). Age also matters such
that older people tend to make external attributions for
actors’ behavior and/or outcomes, whereas younger people
tend to make internal attributions (Chen & BlanchardFields,
1997). Accountability judgments are also likely to
change should the observer have more personal and direct
experience in the domain area being assessed (Balcatis &
Dunning, 2008).
Practical Applications
Our results have several implications. First, employees
evaluate themselves and others differently and thus an
awareness of this fact may enable organizational leaders/
supervisors to make and/or seek out more balanced and
objective evaluations of subordinates for performance evaluation
purposes. Organizational leaders should understand
and appreciate that where one stands relative to evaluated
individuals’ matters; thus, they should institute and use
more 360-degree feedback and self-performance review
processes. Second, our findings further substantiate the pivotal
role of employees’ attributional biases because they
clearly inform important organizational and individual outcomes
(e.g., raises, promotions, terminations).
Limitations
This study had limitations. First, our data were cross-sectional;
thus, any claims of causality made or implied cannot
be substantiated. Future research efforts should assess these
relationships in longitudinal and/or more experimental
study designs. Second, due to the cross-sectional nature of
this study, we are unable to assess the temporal order of
judgments of responsibility and accountability. Therefore,
we cannot definitively state which evaluation comes first.
Based on decades of theory (see Schlenker et al., 1994;
Weiner, 1985, 1995, 2004), we assume that subjects begin
their social evaluations of causality (i.e., responsibility) and
then move to assessments of punishability (i.e., accountability).
We recognize, however, that it is possible that
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Brees and Martinko 451
people begin with how punishable someone should be and
then may or may not eventually assess causality. Third, our
responsibility and accountability measures were created for
this study and thus do not have prior empirical evidence of
their validity. Despite this fact, their reliability and validity
were satisfactory. Last, because perceptions of causality
and punishability are likely influenced by a variety of individual
differences, it may have been an omission for us to
not include important individual difference variables in this
study, for example, the locus of control measure. We recognize
that locus of control may, at least in part, help account
for or may influence how employees assign responsibility
and/or accountability. Future studies should consider controlling
for individual differences.
Conclusion
Everyone stands in judgment in social situations, and these
evaluations carry important implications for workplace outcomes.
Prior research evidence reveals that people believe
that they are objective in their assessments of themselves
and others and that they exhibit objectivity and rationalism
in their social assessments (Dunning, 2005). This present
study indicates that this may not be the case. Weiner originally
used the individual as judge and jury metaphor to illustrate
how these social judgments are formed and suggested
that where you stand (e.g., actor or observer) influences such
judgments. In this article, we explained why and how we
sometimes judge others more harshly than we judge ourselves.
This study further illuminates the social judgment
process between actors and observers in the workplace and
has implications for how the interpersonal dynamics evolve
between leaders, coworkers, and subordinates.
Appendix
Measures of Responsibility and Accountability
Self-Based Workplace Scenarios
Minor Mistake Scenario
“During a departmental meeting, your boss asks you for a
routine status update on a project you are currently leading.
While answering your boss’s question, you remember several
other people also needed to be updated on the project status but
were not invited to the current meeting.”
Judgments of Responsibility
7-point scales from “Completely disagree” to
“Completely agree”
(1) It is your fault the people were not updated on the
project.
(2) You are responsible for the people not being updated
on the project.
(3) Because of you, the people were not updated on the
project.
Judgments of Accountability
(1) To what degree should you be held answerable for
the people not being updated?
7-point scale from “Not very answerable” to
“Completely answerable”
(2) How severely should you be punished for the people
not being updated?
7-point scale from “Not at all” to “Extremely”
(3) What action should your boss take in response to the
people not being updated?
7-point scale from “Excuse your behavior” to “Fire
you”
Major Mistake Scenario
“During a departmental meeting, your boss asks you for a
routine status update on a project you are currently leading.
While answering your boss’s question, you remember that
several very important steps early in the project timeline were
not completed. Because these vital steps were overlooked, the
company you work for will now lose the project contract from
your customer and not be reimbursed for the expenses your
company has already incurred.”
Judgments of Responsibility
7-point scales from “Completely disagree” to
“Completely agree”
(1) It is your fault the company is losing this contract.
(2) You are responsible for the company losing this
contract.
(3) Because of you the project contract will be
terminated.
Judgments of Accountability
(1) To what degree should you be held answerable for
your company losing this contract?
7-point scale from “Not very answerable” to
“Completely answerable”
(2) How severely should you be punished for losing this
contract?
7-point scale from “Not at all” to “Extremely”
(3) What action should your boss take in response to the
contact being lost?
7-point scale from “Excuse your behavior” to “Fire
you”
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452 Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies 22(4)
Other-Based Workplace Scenarios
Minor Mistake Scenario
“During a departmental meeting, your boss asks your coworker
for a routine status update on a project he/she is currently
leading. While answering your boss’s question, your coworker
realizes several people also needed to be updated on the project
status but were not invited to the current meeting.”
Judgments of Responsibility
7-point scales from “Completely disagree” to
“Completely agree”
(1) It is your coworker’s fault the people were not
updated on the project.
(2) Your coworker is responsible for the people not
being updated on the project.
(3) Because of your coworker the people were not
updated on the project.
Judgments of Accountability
(1) To what degree should your coworker be held
answerable for the people not being updated?
7-point scale from “Not very answerable” to
“Completely answerable”
(2) How severely should your coworker be punished for
the people not being updated?
7-point scale from “Not at all” to “Extremely”
(3) What action should your boss take in response to the
people not being updated?
7-point scale from “Excuse your coworker’s
behavior” to “Fire your coworker”
Major Mistake Scenario
“During a departmental meeting, your boss asks your coworker
for a routine status update on a project he/she is currently
leading. While answering your boss’s question, your coworker
remembers that several very important steps early in the project
timeline were not completed. Because these vital steps were
overlooked, the company will now lose the project contract
from your customer and not be reimbursed for the expenses
your company has already incurred.”
Judgments of Responsibility
7-point scales from “Completely disagree” to
“Completely agree”
(1) It is your coworker’s fault the company is losing this
contract.
(2) Your coworker is responsible for the company losing
this contract.
(3) Because of your coworker the project contract will
be terminated.
Judgments of Accountability
(1) To what degree should your coworker be held
answerable for your company losing this contract?
7-point scale from “Not very answerable” to
“Completely answerable”
(2) How severely should your coworker be punished for
losing this contract?
7-point scale from “Not at all” to “Extremely”
(3) What action should your boss take in response to the
contract being lost?
7-point scale from “Excuse your coworker’s behavior”
to “Fire your coworker”
Acknowledgment
We’d like to thank Dwight Frink for several helpful comments he
provided in the early development stages of this study.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with
respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this
article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
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Author Biographies
Jeremy Brees is an assistant professor of management at the
University of Scranton. His research focus is on leadership and
attribution theory, accountability, and abusive supervision.
Mark J. Martinko is the Anheuser-Busch eminent scholar of
organizational behavior at Florida A&M University. He is also an
associate editor of the Journal of Organizational Behavior. His
research focus is on leadership and attribution theory.
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